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Abstract 
After the Hong Kong baby boom in the 1950’s, the population are now approaching 
retirement. The Hong Kong Special Administrative government is facing pressure both 
medical and financial in catering for this aging population. There was lack of retirement 
protection in Hong Kong before 2000 which recognised it was a real demographic 
problem. Only one third of the working population was protected by an Occupation 
Retirement Scheme. Since December 2000, a formal and comprehensive retirement 
benefit scheme: The Mandatory Provident Fund Scheme (MPF) was launched by the 
government to cover the majority of working population.  
 
This study aims to examine the extent of people’s understanding of the MPF in relation to 
saving behaviour, investment knowledge, retirement attitudes and demographic factors.  
The research result indicated that the MPF seems to be ineffective in enhancing a saving 
culture, because of the low level of MPF and investment knowledge.  According to 
demographic analysis, having a child, homeownership and age has substantial influence 
on retirement saving. Gender, income level and marital status have limited impacts on it. 
The level of education has no significance at all.  
 
The concluding section suggests that education and information about the MPF play a 
critical role in improving understanding and saving with the MPF. It promotes financial 
inclusion, improves knowledge of risk and investment, offering more investment 
instruments, so as to enhance the commitment of works and enable them to value the 
MPF scheme. In future, retirement benefit reform should be incorporated with social 
security reform, with the cooperation among government, employers, financial 
institutions and individuals.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The aging population is increasing, people are now living longer due to medical 
advancement and improved living standards. The post World War II baby boomers are 
entering into a retirement. The financing of pensioners, and their medical and social 
expenses has become a heavy burden for governments (Disney , 2001; Els, 2004). 
Different forms of pension have been introduced to solve endemic problems (Pension 
Commission, 2004; Samwick, 1998). Saving philosophies and retirement habits are 
causing increasing concern (Bergstrom, 1989; Disney, 1996, Furnham, 1985). However, 
recent research has focused mainly on cognitive processes and life cycle changes (Blake, 
2004; Webley et al, 2001, Kotlikoof, 1963), pensioners’ attitudes and understanding of 
pension related matters are under research (Webley et al., 2001; Lewis et al, 1995). At a 
macro level, Hong Kong has maintained a relatively high saving level at 30 percent, but 
there is no statistical analysis on individual household savings (Siu, 2002).  At a micro 
level, it is not known whether the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) scheme can induce 
greater savings (Siu, 2000). In Australia, the mandatory superannuation system has been 
implemented for its first five years, loans were increased in proportion to contributions 
(Economist, 1998).  The relationships between saving attitude, MPF knowledge and 
retirement behaviour are under research in Hong Kong.  
 
  
The purpose of this study is to find the extent of people understanding of the Mandatory 
Provident Fund (MPF) and how that compares with the future MPF schemes, and to 
explore peoples saving attitudes and behaviour as retirement approaches. It will assess 
whether these are consistent with the intent of the MPF in promoting retirement saving. 
Thus, this research attempts to examine how MPF knowledge, investment knowledge, 
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retirement behaviour and demographic factors influence peoples saving plans for their 
retirement.   
  
Knowing people’s attitudes towards saving and retirement are crucial. Attitude can be 
used to predict future behaviour; it can also affect attitudes and psychological perspectives 
(Foxall, 1997). By identifying factors which influence saving and retirement, more 
effective and focused measures and policies can be proposed for a better for retirement. 
The research findings may be used as a blue print by the Mandatory Provident Fund 
Authority and Social Welfare Department in Hong Kong for any future social security 
reform.  Financial institutions may make use of the findings to design tailor made 
investments and retirement products for specifically targeted segments. Individuals will 
benefit from their being financially independent, and will enjoy a satisfactory standard of 
living as pensioners. They will achieve satisfaction and maximum benefits by organising 
their retirement saving.  Ultimately, society as a whole will benefit from alleviating 
pensioner poverty.   
 
 
This dissertation will be structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 will first introduce the demographic background in Hong Kong and its impact 
on the Hong Kong economy. The social security system including Comprehensive Social 
Security Assistance (CSSA), Old Age Allowance (OAA) and Occupational Retirement 
Schemes will be outlined, with a particular focus on the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) 
Schemes  will be explained in detail.  
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Chapter 3 will review the literature relating to the demographic challenges, the reasons for 
intervention in pension matters and various kinds of pension system. A life cycle model 
will offer a theoretical perspective and explain saving in relation to pension provision. 
Several independent and dependent variables, and their relationships, will be identified, 
and nine hypotheses will be defined.    
 
Chapter 4 will explain how to select a sample for this research. The quantitative methods 
and closed ended questionnaires are used. The questionnaire layout will be explained.  
 
Chapter 5 will first provide a basic description of the respondents’ background. SPSS 
software is used to analyse the correlation between the understandings of the MPF, saving 
behaviour, investment knowledge, and retirement behaviour. Three specific areas of 
additional voluntary saving, saving orientation and MPF benefit payment methods are 
selected to conduct a detailed analysis across those with a different demographic 
background. Finally, future MPF development will be discussed.  
 
Chapter 6 is a discussion about MPF schemes including their advantages and 
disadvantages. Several recommendations such as financial inclusion, providing more 
education and information, and social security reform will be examined in detail.  
 
Chapter 7 will conclude that the MPF is a saving foundation or basis which is not 
sufficient to wholly protect retirement. In dealing with the demographic challenges, the 
government has attempted to institutionalise saving by MPF scheme. People are required 
to join the labour market, so as to be covered by the scheme. Bank, financial institutions 
and insuers are expected to play a more important role in the pension market. The future 
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MPF reform is expected to integrate with social security reform, in order to offer more 
incentives toward retirement saving.  
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Chapter 2 Background 
In Hong Kong the retirement age is usually not clearly defined. Different companies 
define their own retirement ages. Most public institutions set their retirement age at 60 
years old, but public services deliver subsidised medical or social security services until 
the age of 65. Thus, there is a 5 year gap between the working retirement age and benefit 
entitlement age. Until the introduction of the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) Scheme, 
the statutory normal retirement age was defined at 65 years old, whereas early retirement 
age was 60 years old.  
 
The government has taken a regulatory role in setting up a Mandatory Provident Fund 
Authority (MPFA) to enforce and monitor the MPF system. The MPF is managed by 
trustees such as HSBC, Bank of Consortium, Manulife and Prudential (MPFA, 2004). 
Employers select MPF service provision and schemes, while employees can choose their 
own investment portfolio within the selected schemes. All MPF members can withdraw 
their accrued benefits at age 65.    
 
In this section, the demographic challenges of the aging population and its impact on   
Hong Kong’s economy will be examined. Four social security schemes have been 
implemented to provide assistance to the elderly including the Comprehensive Social 
Security Assistance (CSSA), the Old Age Allowance (OAA), the Occupational 
Retirement Scheme Ordinance (ORSO) and the Mandatory Provident Fund Scheme 
(MPF), with a particular focus on MPF schemes which will be explained in detail.  
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2.1 Demographic Factors 
2.1.1 The Aging Population 
Hong Kong has faced demographic challenges since the 1970s, in the decade between 
1971 and 1981 the aging population aged over 65 increased from 4.5 in 1971 percent to 
8.7 percent in 2001. By 2004, over 12 percent of population were aged over 65 as shown 
in the Table 2.1. The proportion of the aged population has increased three fold since the 
1970s (Census and Statistics Department, 2003). The Hong Kong Census and Statistics 
Department (2005) estimated that the retired population will further increase to 17.2 
percent by 2021 and 24.3 percent by 2031 (Table 2.2 ).  
 
Table 2.1 Hong Kong: Mid-Year Population by Age Group 
 1995 (mid-year) 1999 (mid-year) 2004 (Census) 
Age Group (‘000) % (‘000) % (‘000) % 
Under 15 1,195.1 19.4 1,182.9 17.6 1025.2 14.9 
16-64 4,359.2 70.8 4,802.9 71.5 5041.0 73.0 
65 and over 601.8 9.8 734.9 10.9 829.3 12.1 
Total 6,156.1 100.0 6,720.7 100.0 6895.5 100.0 
Source: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong (1996, 1997, 2005) 
  
Table 2.2 Population Projection Aged Over 65  
Year Population aged 65 or above  % of total population  
1971 182, 300 4.5 
1981 344,300 6.6 
1991 502,400 8.7 
2001 753,600 11.2 
2011 919,600 12.2 
2021 1,414,400 17.2 
2031 2,120,000 24.3 
Sources: Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, 2002 and Hong Kong Population Projections 2002-2031, 
Census and Statistics Department 
 
 
2.1.2 The Dependency Ratio 
People in Hong Kong enjoy the longest life expectancies in the world. The Hong Kong 
Government (2004) illustrates some important demographic features of Hong Kong, table 
2.3 shows that the projection of the life expectancy will increase to 78 years old for males 
and 83 years old for female by 2016. The fertility rate reduced from 1.17 in 1996 to 0.96 
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in 2002, which is well below replacement level. In addition, the mortality rate remains at a 
low level which dropped from 7.6 per 1000 population in 1981 to 4.9 per 1000 population 
in 2001, the pace of population ageing will naturally increase very fast (Hong Kong 
Government, 2004).  Table 2.4 indicates the elderly dependency ratio in the next decade 
will continue to increase from 158 in 2002 to 198 in 2016, then further rise significantly 
to 380 by 2031. Census and Statistics Department (2003) also shows that since the post-
war baby boomers in the 1950s will by that time of retirement age.  
 
Table 2.3 Hong Kong: Expectation of Life at Selected Ages, 1977-2016 
 Age 
 Male Female 
Year At Birth At 60 At Birth At 60 
1977 70.1 16.4 76.7 21.1 
1986 74.1 18.5 79.4 22.6 
1996 76.3 20.0 81.8 24.1 
2006* 77.5 20.8 82.8 24.8 
2016* 78.1 21.1 83.4 25.1 
* 2006 and 2016 figures are projections 
Source: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong (1997) 
 
Table 2.4 Hong Kong: Elderly Dependency Ratio 2002-2031 
Year Child Elderly Overall 
2002 223 158 381 
2006 203 162 365 
2011 180 164 344 
2016 178 198 376 
2021 179 245 424 
2026 180 313 493 
2031 182 380 562 
Notes: the Child dependency ratio refers to the number of persons aged under 15 per 1,000 persons aged 
between 15 and 64. 
 
The overall dependency ratio refers to the number of persons aged under 15 and aged 65 and over per 1,000 
persons aged between 15 and 64 
 
Sources: Hong Kong Government (2004) Report of the Task force on Population Policy 
 
 
2.2 How Demographic Changes Impact on Economics 
The ageing population increases financial pressure on the Hong Kong government and 
ultimately adversely affects to slow down the economic growth. Detail will be explained 
as follows.  
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2.2.1 Increase Social Security Expenditure 
The pressure of old age expenditure is increasing exponentially as the retirement 
population increases. In 2003, 61% of the population aged 60 or above are receiving 
Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) or Old Age Allowance (OAA). Both 
schemes are solely tax-financed and non-contributory. The total government expenditure 
in financing assistance for the elderly increased from HK$7.8 billion in 1997/98 to 
HK$11.8 billion in 2002/03. The number of elderly CSSA recipients is expected to 
increase by 304% in 30 years.  It is estimated that by 2031, the total payment for OAA 
and CSSA will reach HK$10.4 billion and HK$20.8 billion respectively. In addition, the 
increase of the ageing population puts extra pressure on healthcare expenditure (Social 
Welfare Department, 2004, Hong Kong Government, 2004)   
 
2.2.2 Slow Down Economic Growth 
A higher proportion of resources will be deployed to cater for the needs of the elderly. A 
higher dependency ratio means that a smaller number of the working age group will have 
to bear a heavier burden of supporting the elderly group. Likewise, the Government is 
suffering an economic crisis in having to rely on a small portion of working group to fund 
the social security bill for the retired population.  In the long run, the higher proportion of 
resources devoted to an ageing population will mean that fewer resources will be 
allocated to productive investment or to the younger generation of society (Siu, 2001). 
Consequently, a prolonged economic downturn, dampening expectations and reducing 
competitiveness may well result.  
To sum up, Hong Kong is facing a serious demographic crisis. As life expectancy rises 
and the birth rates reduces, the proportion of the aged population increases rapidly. The 
government has worked with the Elderly Commission to enhance awareness of the old 
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age issues, which implies the roles of individuals and their interrelation is changing 
markedly.  
 
2.3 Social Security  
2.3.1 The World Bank’s Three Pillars 
The World back conducted a global examination of old-age security in 1994. The report: 
“Adverting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth” 
suggested that an effective social security measures would consist of three pillars: 
 
1. A publicly managed compulsory system with minimal welfare level preventing 
poverty for the old people; 
2. A privately managed mandatory saving system; and 
3. A voluntary savings system. 
 
The three pillars approach aims to redefine systemic risk through the combination of 
private and public systems and to alleviate political pressures. The report recommended 
reducing the role of the first (public) pillar and stressing the role of the second (private) 
pillar, in order to promote long term saving, to develop capital markets and to facilitate 
economic growth.  
 
2.4 Social Security in Hong Kong 
2.4.1 Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA), Old Age Allowance (OAA) 
In Hong Kong, there are four major social security schemes: Comprehensive Social 
Security Assistance (CSSA), Old Age Allowance (OAA), Occupational Retirement 
Schemes (ORSO) and Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes (MPF). Cash benefits in the 
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form of a Public Assistance Scheme were developed in 1971, followed by old Age 
Allowances which were introduced in 1973 (Chak, 2003). The general principle of social 
security in Hong Kong is residual and remedial to cater for people who cannot get 
financial support from their families and social networks. The government only provides a 
limited assistance as a safety net. The comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) 
and the Old Age Allowance (OAA) schemes is a major social security prop for the aged. 
It is not designed as a retirement supplement, though it is performing a similar function.  
 
The CSSA Scheme, which is means-tested, provides a safety net for those individuals and 
families who cannot support themselves financially. It was implemented in 1994 to 
replace the Public Assistance Scheme. The amount payable to able-bodied elderly person 
is HK$ 2,140 per month. The OAA is a provision to provide Hong Kong residents aged 
65 or above and meet their special needs arising from disability or old age. The OAA is a 
"consolation" for not having a retirement protection scheme (Ho, 2001). The provisions of 
the OAA are means tested for those aged from 65 to 74, the amount of payment is 
HK$605 per month; while the non-means-tested provision for those aged over 70 is about 
HK$2,240 per month. Table 2.5 shows the asset limits and amount of benefits of CSSA 
and OAA. The social security expenditure increased five times in the last decade, which 
was HK$ 21.8 billion in 2002/03, compared with HK$4.4 billion in 1992/93 (Social 
Welfare Department, 2004). 
 
Table 2.5 Comprehensive Social Security Assistance Scheme 
 Asset Limit 
(HK$) 
 Amount of standard Rate 
 Per Month (HK$) 
Able-bodied aged 60 or above 22,000  2,140 
     
Old Age Allowance   
Aged 65-69 160,000  625 
Aged 70 or above Nil  705 
Source: Social Welfare Department (2004) Annual Report 
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2.4.2 Occupational Retirement Schemes 
Hong Kong has developed privately managed retirement schemes since 1919. Most of 
them are occupational based in Hong Kong. Pension in a form of regular payment is not 
common, except for some members of the Civil Servant pension schemes. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, many international firms established schemes in Hong Kong provided lump 
sum payments for terminated or retired employees (Ho et al, 2004). These occupational 
schemes are not regulated. In 1993, the HKSAR government enacted an Occupational 
Retirement Schemes Ordinance (ORSO) to register all these voluntary privately managed 
retirement schemes, in order to ensure ORSO were schemes were properly operated and 
funded. However, only one third of the workers (1.1 million) were covered by voluntary 
retirement scheme or pension scheme in 1999. Two million of the workforce did not have 
any retirement protection (Chow, 2002; Ho et al, 2004; MPFA, 2002).  
 
2.4.3 The Mandatory Provident Fund Scheme (MPF)  
Under the strong financial pressure induced by the aging population, a new Mandatory 
Provident Fund Scheme Ordinance (MPFSO) was approved in 1995, the scheme was 
launched in 2000. It is a privately managed, employment based, defined contribution 
scheme to protect the entire workforce (Siu, 2000). The MPF is complemented by 
personal savings and the CSSA, which is similar to the three-pillar system suggested by 
the World Bank (Chow and Chou, 2004).  
 
2.5 Key Features of Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes (MPF) 
This section elaborates the key features of the MPF system. The MPF is a retirement 
saving program to provide a lump sum retirement payment. All the contributions are 
invested under a trust arrangement which is regulated by Hong Kong Law. All scheme 
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assets are held independently from trustees or investment managers, so as to protect 
scheme members from financial risks. Currently 85 percent of the workforce (3.4 million) 
is protected by the retirement scheme (MPFA, 2004). By March 2005, 65 percent of 
employees will have joined the MPF scheme, 20 percent have joined other retirement 
schemes, 11 percent not required to join a local scheme and 4 percent are required to join 
but have not yet joined any MPF scheme (MPFA, 2005).  
 
2.5.1 Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority (MPFA) 
The mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority (MPFA) was set up under the MPFSO 
in 1998 to ensure effective and efficient operation of the MPF system. In 2000, it took 
over from the Office of the Registrar of Occupational Retirement Schemes. The major 
functions of MPFA include ensuring compliance with the MPF legislation, registering 
MPF schemes, approving MPF investment funds, regulating approved trustees, as well as 
making rules for the MPF contributions, schemes administration and investment funds. 
Apart from MPFA, the Securities and Futures Commission, the Insurance Authority and 
the Monetary Authority are responsible for the regulation of MPF products and service 
providers (MPFA, 2002). 
 
2.5.2 The Transitional arrangement between ORSO Scheme and MPF Schemes     
Under the MPF system, an employer who already operated an ORSO scheme needed to 
change the scheme in one of the following forms (Gadbury et al 2004, MPFA 2004): 
 
ORSO Scheme with Open Membership 
The employer offers employees the choice of either the MPF exempted ORSO scheme or 
an MPF scheme to their existing members   
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ORSO Scheme with Close Membership 
Existing members continue to accrue benefits under the ORSO scheme, but new 
employees are required to join an MPF scheme. 
 
Wind up ORSO Scheme 
The employer will have to enrol all existing members and new employees into an MPF 
scheme.  The existing ORSO accrued benefits will continue to be invested, until existing 
members receive their ORSO benefits in accordance with the old ORSO schemes rules.   
 
2.5.3 Protection of Scheme Assets 
All MPF assets are managed under trust and are held by independent trustees. All trustees 
and provident services must meet stringent requirements. Each of them should have net 
assets of at least HK$ 150 million. In addition, all MPF schemes should be registered by 
the MPFA to ensure they comply with the legislative requirements. Professional 
indemnity insurance is provided to cover losses of prescribed risks such as fraud and 
negligence, but it does not cover losses from poor investment decisions. A compensation 
fund is set up to protect scheme members suffering losses from any illegal conduct by 
service providers. The Hong Kong government provided HK$ 600 million to set up the 
fund, supplemented by a levy of 0.03 percent on MPF net asset value (MPFA, 2002).  
 
2.5.4 MPF Service Providers 
The approved trustees are the major bodies who manage MPF schemes, and have to check 
the amount of MPF contributions accurately. In 2004, there were 19 MPF trustees 
(Appendix 1). The top 10 MPF service accounted for 89 percent of the Market Share as 
shown in Chat 2.1 (Watson Wyatt, 2004). If employers fail to pay the contribution, every 
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month the trustees will report this to the MPFA which may impose surcharge and/or 
imprisonment. Some service providers may out source the scheme administration and 
custodial duties. Trustees must appoint an investment manger to ensure the MPF 
investment is complying with the relevant requirements. MPF intermediaries are 
responsible for marketing activities to provide the MPF information and to advise on 
related issues (MPFA, 2002).  
 
  Chat 2.1 Top 10 MPF Service Providers Market Share 
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2.5.5 MPF Scheme Types 
Employers must register relevant employees in one of the three types of MPF scheme. In 
2004, there were 43 master trust schemes, 2 industry schemes and 2 employer sponsored 
schemes registered (MPFA, 2004). Employers should arrange for their employees to 
become a member of the chosen scheme. Self-employed persons should enrol in a master 
trust scheme, or if appropriate, an industry scheme (MPFA, 2002). The scheme details are 
as follows: 
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Firstly, Master trust schemes are the most common, which are open to employer, self-
employed people and allows terminated MPF and ORSO members to transfer their 
accrued benefits from other schemes. By pooling the contributions from small employers, 
the master trust scheme enjoys economies of scale and a high degree of efficiency in 
investment and administration. It is appropriate for small and medium sized companies.  
 
Secondly, employer-sponsored schemes are operated by a single employer and it’s 
subsidiaries. This type of scheme is restricted to it’s own employees. Only employers with 
a large number of employees may benefit from running this type of scheme in a cost 
effective manner.  
 
Thirdly, industry Schemes are designed for a highly mobile situation such as is found in 
catering and construction industries. Casual employees in these industries can join the 
schemes regardless of the duration of their employment. Employers and self-employed 
persons from these two industries can be enrolled in industry schemes. Participation in the 
industry schemes is not compulsory; employers can opt to join either master trust schemes 
or employer-sponsored schemes. The major advantage of the industry scheme is that 
accrued pension rights are portable within the scheme to minimize transfer costs.  Thus, 
industry scheme members are not required to change their scheme if their new 
employment is in the same industry if both previous and new employers have joined the 
same industry scheme. 
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2.5.6 Investment Funds 
Trustees appoint investment managers to make long term investment of MPF 
contributions. Employers choose MPF service providers to provide at least one scheme to 
employees (Appendix 2). Each scheme generally includes several investment portfolios 
for its members. Scheme members choose their own investment portfolios within their 
employers’ chosen scheme (MPFA, 2002; Gadbury et al, 2004). Most schemes usually 
include the following funds (MPFA, 2002).  
 
Capital Preservation Fund 
According to MPF ordinance, each scheme must include a Capital Preservation Fund, 
which is similar to a money market fund. The capital preservation fund intends to provide 
a low investment risk product and to achieve an investment return comparable to the 
banks’ saving rate. This fund is kept in the Hong Kong dollar investment market and 
invested in short-term debt securities. The average investment period should not exceed 
90 days. Each month administrative expenses can be deducted from the fund, but only 
when investment returns of the fund exceed the earnings calculated on the prescribed 
savings rate. The rate is declared by the MPFA each month. Thus, the capital preservation 
fund does not guarantee any return and may suffer losses.  
 
Guaranteed Fund 
A guaranteed fund may be a conservative fund, or a low risk fund. It consists of equity, 
bond and cash. There are two kinds of guaranteed fund: hard guarantee and soft guarantee. 
A hard guarantee fund is obligated to pay a minimum net return without meeting any pre-
condition requirement. A soft guaranteed fund will only pay the minimum return when 
 21
certain conditions are met such as a withdrawal of MPF benefit and a minimum 
investment period.   
 
Money Market Fund 
The money market fund is mostly for short-term investment such as commercial 
investment and treasury bills. It is sensitive to the interest rate. The credit risk of the fund 
is relatively low, but its return is relatively higher than interest earned from saving 
deposits. 
 
Bond fund 
The Bond Fund is usually invested in debt securities issued by the government, banks and 
commercial institutions. Bond funds offer a stable income from interest and capital 
appreciation. The Higher credit rating of bonds is associated with low risk and low returns. 
 
Stable Fund 
A stable fund consists of both bonds and stocks, it is also called a balanced fund. The fund 
may be invested either globally or regionally to take advantage of investment 
opportunities in different markets and economies. The estimated return of the stable fund 
is higher than the bond fund but lower than the equity fund. 
 
Equity Fund 
An equity fund mainly invests in the global market or in a single country, which aims to 
earn a higher rate of return through capital appreciation. The price of an equity fund can 
fluctuate, since stock market can go up or down within a short period of time.  
Index-tracking Fund 
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The major aim of an index tracking fund is to track the investment performance of an 
index. It also aims to acquire an investment return closely matched to the performance of 
the index being tracked such as Hang Seng Index Tacking Fund.  
 
2.5.7 Coverage 
All full-time and part-time employees aged between 18 and 65 and employed for over a 
continuous 60 days must join the MPF scheme. For catering or construction industries, 
casual employees are employed on a daily basis or for a fixed period less than 60 days. 
They are still required to join MPF schemes (Siu, 2002). Self-employed workers such as 
sole proprietors or partners in a partnership are also required to enrol. Under the MPF 
ordinance, certain groups are exempted including domestic helpers, hawkers and civil 
servants covered by statutory pensions. Apart from these exempt persons,   trustees cannot 
reject any application to eligible by schemes members under the non-refusal legislation 
(MPFA, 2002).   
 
2.5.8 Contributions 
The amount of the MPF qualified earning lies between HK$5,000 and HK$20,000 per 
month (table 2.6). Both employer and employee should each contribute 5 percent of 
relevant income and subject to a maximum amount of contribution HK$1,000 per month. 
Relevant income includes wages, salaries, commission, bonus, leave pay, gratuity and 
allowances, but excludes housing allowances, severance payments and long service 
payments. To avoid leading to financial difficulties, if an employee’s relevant income is 
less than HK$ 5,000 per month then that employee is exempted from contributing, but the 
employer is still required to contribute. Each month employers are required to deduct their 
employees’ MPF contributions from their incomes, and then submit it to the trustees. 
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Employers are also required to issue a monthly pay-record to employees stating the 
employee’s relevant income, and both the amount of contribution and date of contribution. 
Self-employed persons are required to contribute 5 percent of relevant income subject to 
maximum of HK$1,000 per month. Those whose income is less than HK$ 5,000 per 
month are also exempted from contribution (MPFA, 2004; Gardbury et al, 2004).  
 
Table 2.6 MPF Contribution Rates 
 
Monthly Relevant Income 
 
 
< HK$5,000
 
HK$ 5,000 or above 
Employers’ 
Contribution
5% 5%  
Max. contribution amount HK$1,000/ month
 
 
MPF members  
Employees’ 
Contribution
 
Nil 
 
5%  
Max. contribution amount HK$1,000 /month
 
 
   
Self-employed Person   Contribution Nil 5%  
Max. contribution amount HK$1,000 /month  
Source: MPFA (2004) Annual Report 
 
2.5.9 Voluntary Contributions 
Contributions in excess of the mandatory minimum amounts made by employers, 
employees and self-employed persons are regarded as voluntary contributions. The 
vesting, preservation and portability requirements will be subject to individual schemes 
rules (MPFA, 2002).  
 
2.5.10 Vesting and Benefit 
Mandatory contributions and investment returns made by employees and employers are 
fully and immediately vested to scheme members (MPFA, 2002). Scheme members have 
to bear management fees deducted from both members and employers’ contributions, and 
to suffer gain or loss from investment risks. Employer contributions and their investment 
return can be used to offset long service and severance payments. The payment will be 
deducted from employer contributions or refunded to employers, while employee 
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contributions will not offset any payments. Should employees change their jobs, their 
benefits can either be retained in existing master trust schemes, or transfered to new 
employers’ MPF accounts or transfered to any other MPF service providers’ preserved 
accounts. Therefore, ex employees enjoy freedom to choose their service providers for 
their accrued benefits. 
 
2.5.11 Withdrawal of Accrued benefits 
Scheme members reaching the normal retirement age of 65 can withdraw the total accrued 
benefits in a tax-free lump sum. There are no regulations to restrict how to spend the lump 
sum (Gadbury, 2004). Several conditions allow members to claim for the benefits, as 
follows: 
x Decease. The accrued benefits will be paid to personal representatives. 
x Early Retirement. Reach the age of 60 or above and ceased employment or self-
employed.  
x Total incapability 
x Permanent departure from Hong Kong (once only option) 
x Small balance. If the total balance of all MPF accounts is less than HK$5,000 and 
no MPF contribution were made in the last 12 months. And scheme members do 
not intend to be employed or self-employed. 
 
2.5.12 Fees and Charges 
MPF charges can be classified into three ways including asset-based fees such as trustee 
and investment management fees, annual lump sum charges to scheme members such as a 
membership fee and event based fees such as changes in investment portfolio (MPFA, 
 25
2002). The basic administration cost is usually between 2 and 3 percent of the 
contribution amount (Mok, 2000). 
  
 
2.5.13 Tax Deduction 
Employees and self-employed people’s mandatory contributions are tax deductible, 
subject to maximum limit of HK$12,000 per year. Additional voluntary contributions are 
not exempt from tax. Employers’ MPF contributions are tax deductible against Profit Tax 
up to 15% of the employee’s earnings (MPFA, 2002).  
 
To sum up, the increasing age of the population and the dependency ratio increases the 
financial burden and slows down economic growth. The traditional social security 
systems: Comprehensive Social Security Assistance and Old Age Allowance solely rely 
on governmental funding which is inadequate to protect those in retirement. Occupational 
Retirement Schemes plays a limited role in protect a small portion of the workforce. In 
2000, a formal and legal MPF scheme has been introduced with a main aim of protecting 
the entire workforce.  
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
This chapter aims to analyse the demographic crisis and its impact on government 
intervention and pension reform. A life cycle saving model provides a framework for a 
relationship between saving and retirement. The three major variables of saving, 
investment and retirement, and their relationships with pension will be analysed. Then 
demographic factors such as gender, age, and income and their influence on retirement 
saving will be discussed.  
 
3.1 Demographic Challenges 
3.1.1 The Baby Boom  
After population growth known as the baby-boom in 1945, was experienced. Now these 
people most individuals are living longer due to medical advancement and improved 
living standards. Baby boomers are soon to reach retirement age. The low fertility rate is 
not sufficient to replace the population. A macroeconomic theory postulates that the aging 
population affects saving and investment rates, national productivity, governmental 
spending and labour supply (Disney, 1996). Thus, the increasing aged population will 
increase pressure on taxation in order to finance social security bill.  The Italian ageing 
population caused a deficit in their social security pension in the 90s, leading to both 
economic and political crises (Disney, 1996). The Dutch government estimated that the 
ratio of the pension liability to gross wages will increase from 2.6 in 2001 to 4.5 in 2030 
(Ewijk and van de Ven, 2002). There is pressure to reduce the costs and scope of social 
security, which will influence  personal savings and retirement planning.   
 
 

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3.1.2 The Dependency Ratio 
The increasing financial burden will produce a problem of more consumers rather than 
producers in the economy. If the number of workers in the labour market decreases, the 
economic dependency ratio will increase (Disney et. al, 1994). Economic theory argues 
that increased longevity rather than a reduced labour force will cause a higher dependency 
ratio. Individuals need to work longer in order to maintain their desired consumption 
levels (Disney et. al, 1994). However, in the UK the dependency ratio is not yet 
significant, and has not affected consumption and personal savings. In the USA and East 
Asian areas, private savings is negatively related to the dependency ratio, social security 
expenditure and government saving (Edwards, 1996).  
 
3.2 Reasons for intervention 
The Government may intervene in the pension market to promote saving under certain 
conditions. If a low saving rate in bank is due to individuals investing in the capital 
markets to obtain a higher return and the better retirement protection, the government may 
not need to encourage savings. However, if saving is low because of unrealized saving 
needs and financial illiteracy, government intervention will be required (Lusardi et al, 
2001). Usually, government encourages savings and investment for the following reasons:  
 
Banks (1998) examined reasons for state intervention to encourage saving for retirement. 
Paternalism is the major rationale for government intervention, since people will save less 
than the optimal level for retirement. Young people tend to spend more than to save, and 
then expect the government will cater for their retirement. Increasing old age social 
security may lead to a financial crisis.  Redistribution may be another motive for 
intervention in order to reallocate resources from the rich to the poor. In the UK and 
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Australia, the pension seems to be a tax imposed on workers. European systems are not 
designed mainly for redistribution effects (Banks and Emmerson, 2000).  
 
People may be myopic about retirement benefits. Different pension schemes involve 
different risks which are suitable for different people. For instance, state programmes are 
at risk from policy changes, defined benefit schemes are subject to earning risks, and 
defined contribution plans are subject to investment risks. If individuals do not have 
pension knowledge, they may make wrong decisions and not save enough for their 
retirement. The UK retirement survey showed that 40 percent of individuals’ retirement 
income will be less than expected (Dilnot et al, 1994). The US also experienced similar 
retirement problems because of unexpected ill health in the 1990s. However, the cost of 
advice and regulation may reach 20-30 percent of pension saving, and therefore may be 
unprofitable in selling pension provisions to low income groups. It is doubtful whether a 
voluntary saving pension market is suitable for low earners (Pension Commission, 2004). 
Monitoring the pension market is also problematical. In the UK, mis-selling issues were 
widespread in the 1990’s. It proved that inadequate pension advice would adversely affect 
pensioners (Disney, 2001).  
 
3.3 The Pension System 
The Pension provides a source of income after retirement. This section will explain three 
major pension systems: Pay as You Go (PAYG), defined benefit and defined contribution 
schemes. The UK pension system will be explained.  
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3.3.1 Pay as You Go (PAYG) System 
Governments have intervened in the pension market because of the above stated reasons. 
The earlier pension system is unfunded, which is called Pay as You Go (PAYG) system. 
The existing employees paid directly to finance existing retirees. However, potential 
problems may arise with demographic risks such as a decrease in the birth rate, or an 
increased life expectancy. The number of pensioners will increase more than the number 
of employees (Banks and Emmerson, 2000). To maintain the pension system, employees 
are required to contribute more or retirees receive less pension. Otherwise, the system will 
become unsustainable without cutting benefit. In addition, an incomplete PAYG system 
will reduce people’s incentive to work and to save. Particularly, the rich benefit most from 
this type of system, they tend to participate in the labour force later, to retire earlier and to 
live longer.  
 
3.3.2 Defined benefit and Defined Contribution Schemes 
Occupational retirement schemes are funded, and are mainly classified into defined 
benefit (DB) schemes and defined contribution (DC) schemes. A DB scheme is one in 
which the employer’s contribution rates is not defined. The amount of benefits is 
calculated by a formula based on age, years of service and final average salary. A DC 
scheme is one in which employers’ and employee’s contribution rates are defined. 
Employees’ benefits are based on the accumulated contributions and investment return 
(MPFA, 2002).  
 
DB schemes can spread the risk over generations. The risk can be increased or induced by 
unemployment and job changes and cause economic exposure. The benefit is visible, but 
financing the benefit is not as transparent. In contrast, a DC scheme will not spread the 
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risk. Scheme members suffer investment risks, future wage and earning risks. The 
financing of benefit is apparent but neither its cost nor the outcome is clear. In response to 
increasing life expectancy, a DC scheme may adjust rates and alter rules automatically for 
individuals. A DB scheme requires an actuary to make any adjustment (Banks and 
Emmerson, 2000). They affect retirement decisions, private DB pensions tend to 
encourage early retirement, while DC schemes tend to defer retirement (Blake, 2004).  
 
3.3.3 The Pension System in the UK 
After the Second World War, the British government attempted to institutionalise 
retirement benefits (Phillipson, 1999). The UK pension scheme is composed of three tiers. 
The fist tier is a flat rate mandatory publicly funded pension, which is financed by 
employers and employees on a pay-as-you-go basis through the National Insurance 
System.  The second tier is for all employees whose salary is over a certain limit. They 
can opt to choose a private pension or the social security programme. The third tier is 
additional voluntary saving (Disney, 2001).  
 
The UK pension system is facing several challenges such as a reducing working 
population, increasing economical inactively per person prior retirement age, as well as an 
increasing part-time working population and sub contract employees. In addition, the 
downturn in the labour market induces dismissal or redundancy, or forces employees to 
retire earlier. The ageing population implies the intergenerational risk sharing under Pay 
As You Go (PAYG) pension schemes are disappearing. The state pension system is 
reducing benefits to the returned in real terms, but the private pension system is not 
expanding at the same pace to offset the state’s retreating role.  
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Since the 1980’s, the volatility of investment returns and higher life expectancy has 
imposed pressure on defined benefit schemes and a shift to defined contribution schemes. 
Retirement has become a social risk rather than social right. People are forced to develop 
their own retirement plans. Risk is further institutionalized and privatised. It ceases to be a 
national or social matter and becomes an individual matter. The actual funded pension is 
reducing and the gap enlarging under these demographic challenges (Vickerstaff, 2003).  
The UK official estimated that 9 million people may be under-saving. A well planned 
pension system required to take proactive measures to eliminate of social inequity and 
economic inefficiency (Pension Commission, 2004).  
 
3.4 Theoretical Perspectives 
3.4.1 The Effect of Pensions in a Life-Cycle Savings model 
Life cycle theory studied saving and investment behaviour in relation to retirement 
(Feldstein 1944, 1980). The life cycle hypothesis assumed that under an efficient capital 
and perfect labour market without tax and uncertainty, individuals would spread 
consumption and expenditure evenly over the life. Different age groups have different 
saving behaviours. The model predicted that young people were spenders. In the early 
stage, individuals consume more durables such as cars and properties. In middle age, they 
save more for retirement when housing loans are paid off and children are grown up.  
 
French (2005) adopted a simulation method to match the life cycle model, in order to 
explore pension, social security and taxation influences on the labour force. The sample 
was drawn from the Survey of Economic Opportunity to represent the US population. The 
survey found that people’s expenditure increases by 44 percent between aged 30 and 55, 
then drops to 22 percent at ages between 55 and 65. During retirement, wealth is 
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maximized, income decreases. Individuals will capitalise their bonds and stocks to finance 
for the rest of the life. Therefore, people attempt to smooth their expenditure during life 
time, so as to maximise their wealth and thus create a saving pattern in their lives.  
The life cycle hypothesis explained who save generally live well into retirement.  People 
usually retire when they reach a specific age. If they are to keep spending after retirement, 
they need to accumulate assets whilst they are earning. The wealth is prepared for 
emergency purposes and subsequently provided bequests. In addition, this hypothesis 
introduced assets into the consumption function, and thereby gave a role to the stock 
market. A rise in stock prices increases wealth and consumption, while a fall in stock 
price would reduce consumption (Byrne, 2004). Hence, consumption is related to the 
financial market and general economic conditions.  
 
3.4.2 Criticism of the Life Cycle Saving Model  
However, there are several criticisms of this model. Firstly, people may not smooth their 
consumption evenly over different stages of life.  At the work stage, people tend to spend 
more on working clothes and travelling. Secondly, individuals do not fully amortise their 
assets at retirement. They may hold some wealth in the form of housing and financial 
assets which tie up their savings. Thirdly, retirees continue to save during their retirement, 
for such things as unpredictable expenditure and medical expenses (Ando, Moro, Cordoba 
and Garlando, 1995; Disney, 1996) Fourthly, some individuals are neither motivated nor 
able to determine an adequate level of saving (Banks and Emmerson, 2000).  
 
In practice, the model cannot fully match the British family structure. There are more 
families without children, and a huge increase of single parent families and single person 
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households. Other studies also found results inconsistent with the life cycle theory. In 
times of stress, particularly economic, precautionary saving tends to be higher, and will 
indirectly facilitate wealth accumulation rather than spending.  Larger bequests may 
become an unintended result of ensuring sufficient capital is available for the very old 
(Smith, 1975; Mirer 1979; Horioka et al.,1996). Retirement benefits from annuities may 
be low as they are stock market related. They may be influenced by incentive and risk 
exposure. In the UK, USA and other developed countries, these factors affecting the 
model cannot accurately predict investment  (Attanasiom, 1997; Burton D, 2001). Though 
the data from theses countries do not provide a complete explanation for retirement and 
saving behaviour, it provides a basic understanding that behaviour is goal-directed. The 
model has partially explained uncertainties of death, existence of social security, and 
savings for heirs, in relation to various patterns of lifetime earnings.  
  
To sum up, the life-cycle model provides the theoretical underpinning that consumption in 
a specific period depends on expectations about lifetime income rather than current 
income.  When individuals are in their working years, their income is high and they are 
willing to save for their retirement years.  When retirement comes, their income drops and 
they spend the wealth previously accumulated.  As applied to this research, the theory 
states that dependent variables of saving behaviour is influenced by demographic factors 
such as age, family status and children.  
    
3.5 Variables 
After reviewing various challenges on pension systems and the life cycle saving model, 
this part will examine saving as a dependent variable.  Retirement behaviour, investment 
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knowledge, and demographic factors are identified as independent variables and their 
relationships and impact will be explored.  
 
3.5.1 Saving 
Saving is a residual between income and consumption (Agosin, 2001). According to the 
life-cycle model, if individuals expect to have high life expectancy, they will then tend to 
save for a pension and future wealth. Pensions include fixed amounts, and surpluses from 
average income or formerly earned wages. Private wealth includes bank accounts, 
insurances, stocks, bonds, real estate, less mortgages and debts.  
 
Saving Motives 
Different factors will affect saving and consumption motives. Individuals who expect a 
higher future income tend to have a higher current consumption. High future income 
insecurity will reduce current expenditure and thus people will save more (Carroll and 
Well, 1994; Carroll, 1994). Risk averse people tend to work more hours, and to save more 
as a buffer against income shocks (Blake, 2004). Intertemporal factors also affect saving 
motives. Chinese are more likely to plan for long term consumptions, such as wedding 
celebrations, and home purchases (King and Dicks, 1982). The English have a tradition of 
saving for a “rainy day” or economic problems unforeseen.  
The motivation for saving and saving for retirement may not be the same (Burton, 2001). 
A British Household survey found that nearly half of respondents questioned said that 
they do not have a specific purpose for saving. The second major saving reason is for a 
holiday, so this type of saving is for the short term. The remaining saving reasons are for 
old age, house purchase, car purchase, home improvement and particularly for children 
higher education. The government wishes to encourage saving because it will stimulate 
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positive economic growth. Saving can increase capital flow into capital markets and thus 
help to develop more investment products. In the long run, more people investing their 
savings will lead to lower transaction costs and will increase the rate of return (Agosin, 
2001). Working and saving can keep individual active in the economy and thus help to 
sustain the economy.  
 
Low Saving Rate 
A low savings rate could be the result of individuals not having a long term saving goal. 
The short term and self-maximizing consumption behaviour undermines the long term 
commitment of family and society. In the UK, an investigation of savings and investment 
behaviour was conducted. The data was collected from four representative surveys: The 
expenditure Survey and the British Household Panel Survey, the General Household 
Survey and the Family Resources Survey. The sample size was 22,166.  The study found 
that the level of saving was low, 39 percent of households have some savings. 41% of 
people saved less than 50 pounds per month. Only 16 percent of respondents saved over 
200 pounds per month (Burton, 2001).  
 
A low saving rate could be due to other reasons. In the U.S., a National Income and 
Product Account saving rate has dropped from 10 percent in 1980’s to 1 percent in the 
2000’s. About 40 percent of the drop was due to the available capital being invested in the 
stock market. Many individuals have accumulated their wealth through investment 
instruments rather than the personal saving account (Lusardi et al, 2001).  If a low saving 
rate is due to bountiful retirement benefits, then the US government will not need to take 
extra powers of intervention.  
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3.5.2 Retirement Behaviours 
Retirement means that individuals work until a certain time, and then quit their work. It 
can be a divided into different stages changing from full time to part time work and 
finally without work (Disney et. al, 1994; Vickerstaff, 2003). Blake (2004) found that  
retirement may further expand to a mixture of work, leisure and learning. Retirement ages 
usually range between 60 and 65. Some employees change to part time work prior to 
retirement; others continue to work beyond normal retirement age. Retirement behaviour 
is affected by various factors such as longevity, housing wealth and pension provision. 
People may work longer if they have more young children (Blake, 2004). After retirement, 
pension becomes a source of income. This is the rationale to save for an adequate 
retirement income (Cagan, 1975; French, 2005). 
 
3.5.3 Investment Knowledge 
Retirement saving is a long term investment. Investing for retirement is complex, both in 
deciding how much to save, and in decisions and how to invest to ensure an adequate 
retirement pension (Byrne, 2004). Investment decisions also require a consideration of 
risk tolerance level, age and personal circumstances.  According to a USA retirement 
survey in 2003, one third of respondents had tried to calculate how much they needed to 
save for retirement. Among these respondents who had tried to estimate the amount of 
saving, 36 percent could neither provide the calculation nor the result. Decision making in 
these circumstances is thus likely to be irrational. 
 
The Portfolio theory stated that benefits arise from diversified investment. It is risky to 
buy only one particular stock. However, individuals are bounded by human rationality, 
self-control and self-interest (Mullainthan and Thaler, 2000). Too many fund choices may 
 37
lead to individuals feeling the complexity makes it difficult to make investment decisions 
(Byrne, 2004). In addition, retirement investment requires an estimate of uncertain factors, 
for instance, future income, investment, investment return, tax, inflation and life 
expectancy. People lack of knowledge may make poor decision making.  
 
3.5.4 The Relationships between Saving, Pension and Retirement  
Burton (2001) noted that government attempted to encourage people to prepare for an 
adequate retirement, but that this has had little impact on saving attitude. Tax incentives 
are not effective. For example, the British government’s Tax Exempt Special Savings 
Accounts and Personal Equity Plans have had a limited impact in motivating people to 
save more. However, the decline of state and occupational retirement schemes implies 
that saving will become more important in the future, and in general people are now 
becoming aware of this.  
 
Several researchers found a substitution between wealth accumulation and pension 
savings (King and Dicks-Mireaux, 1982; Hubbard, 1986 and Jappelli, 1995). Pension has 
replaced other personal savings (Hemming, 2001). Feldstein (1979, 1982) basing his 
research on the life cycle model and explored the relationship between substitution and 
retirement. The substitution effect means that state pensions reduce the incentive of 
private saving for retirement. Retirement effect means that the state pension helps people 
to save more privately to maintain retirement, but it indirectly encourages employees to 
retire earlier.  
 
According to economic theory, the increase in saving for pensions is a change in a form of 
saving.  Pension is a kind of alternative form of saving. If a new asset is a substitute for 
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existing assets, there will be a high offset effect. The life cycle model noted that 
individuals will save less, if they know they will receive benefits in exchange for social 
security. Agosin’s (2001) study found that Chilean government policy was ineffective in 
increasing savings. In the long term, if individuals are forced to save by the social security 
system, they may decumulate their personal saving (Agosin, 2001). In the US, a 
longitudinal survey supported the life-cycle models prediction that there is substitute 
effect between contribution to social security and saving. Individuals will reduce saving in 
other forms (Kotikoff, 1979).  
 
Several researchers argued that social security has had little effect in reducing private 
saving in international aspects (Leimer and Lesnoy, 1982; Feldstein, 1980). Even though 
state pensions have reduced the need for private retirement saving, it does not affect 
elderly labour participation rates. Private occupational schemes directly facilitate savings, 
even thought it reduces labour participation rate. The net saving effect is still positive 
(Feldstein, 1974, 1982). Other researchers found that individuals covered by pensions 
tend to save more than those without pension (Pechman, Aaron and Taussig, 1986).  
Association of British Insurers (2004) indicated that 73 percent of people supported 
compulsory pension saving, more than half of them favour this if the amount of 
contribution is lower or the same as their existing voluntary contribution.  
 
High earners have a displacement effect of pension wealth, but their personal saving is 
not intended to displace their pension. Dollar for dollar substitution may not take place, 
since the rate of return on a pension cannot be predicated accurately, in order to affect the 
saving rate or to shift to other forms of savings. For instance, Dutch households would 
not make a great change in their saving behaviour if the existing pension scheme were cut. 
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26% of them would make additional saving, 17% of respondents would not do so. They 
thought that their pension would be enough. 37% of respondents would not save more 
until a problem arises (Els et al, 2004). These findings rejected the one-for-one 
displacement of savings by pension (Alessie et al., 1997). A study found that government 
saving and social security only partially displaces personal saving in  the UK (Blake, 
2004). 
 
Barro (1974, 1998) criticised researchers for neglecting bequest transfer from parents to 
children. He conducted a time series study from the 1970s to 1990s in the USA. The 
intergenerational transfers may equal burden of retirement benefit and offset the effect of 
social security. Apart from pension, other factors will also affect saving. For instance, 
stock market investors tend to save more additionally. Home ownership is a buffer and 
may be a or supplement for the old age pension. The financial market performance is 
highly affected by interest rates, exchange rates and investment regulations, which will in 
turn affect peoples’ saving behaviour (Lusardi et al, 2001). Therefore, it is difficult to 
estimate peoples’ response to pension policy and to determine the appropriate saving rate. 
The correlation between pension and saving is complex. Whether retirement saving 
programmes can increase saving is still debatable (Engen et al, 1996, Hubbard and 
Skinner, 1996). There is a deserving need to explore what factors can facilitate 
accumulation of pension wealth, as clearly only people with a surplus income may serve 
or invest in pension products 
 
3.6 Demographic Factors Influences on Retirement Saving  
Several academics have investigated factors that affect pension contribution and regular 
saving behaviour. Pension expectation is a critical factor which affects retirement 
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planning and attitudes (Mutran et al, 1997). Individuals believe that they require 
maximum savings and also believe that their private pension can maximize their 
retirement income (Furnham et al, 2002). Furnham (1985) denoted individuals’ saving 
attitude towards saving is related to lifestyle. Peoples behaviour may be apparent; but it is 
their attitudes that are more likely to predict their behaviour (Furnham et al, 200). 
Retirement may not be the major motivation of saving (Munnel, 1976). Various 
demographic factors may affect the relationships between saving and pension. Details 
will be discussed as follows 
 
3.6.1 Gender 
The British Household Panel Study found that females are more likely to lack a private 
pension (Disney, 2001). They would take a ‘wait and see’ approach towards retirement, 
unlike most men. In the UK, women pensioners are poorer than men. 50 percent of 
women have not been covered by an occupational scheme, since they are excluded from 
full time or long term work. Most part-time jobs were performed by women, in which 
their employers did not provide any pension (DSS, 1996). The state pension system also 
assume that women could rely on their husband to support retirement. In contrast, men 
are more likely to be covered by an occupational and or a private.  
 
3.6.2 Age 
Age is positively related to saving and pensions, older people are more positive in saving 
attitude and behaviour (Bergstrom, 1989; Furnham et al, 2002). Younger people enjoy a 
higher financial return towards pension saving because of a compound interest effect, 
while older people are more motivated to save for retirement. They realise that retirement 
is coming soon, and have more concern about comfortable retirement life (Disney and 
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Whitehouse, 1992). British Household Panel Survey found that voluntary saving 
increased with age to maintain standards in retirement. The drawback is that people 
cannot withdraw the benefits to deal with emergent issues prior to retirement (Samwick, 
1998). In addition, there is a strong positive relationship between the middle aged group 
and saving. People aged over 45 are more likely to make voluntary savings as a buffer 
against income shocks (Guariglia and Markose, 2000).  
 
3.6.3 Income and Education 
Educated people are more likely to should risk and to save more (Anonymous, 2005). The 
better educated people are more likely to have stable and well paid jobs, and they tend to 
make more voluntary contributions. In the UK, high earners are more likely to save more 
towards their pensions, but it could also encourage earlier retirement (Fields and Mitchell, 
1984). Less educated people find it difficult to understand the complexity of the charging 
methods, and are thus reluctant to make additional contributions. They are also more 
conservative in investment (Guariglia and Markose, 2000; Muller, 2003). Pension  
education may be by financial seminars. Maki (2001) showed that education to learn 
more about rate of return and features of pensions, would influence individuals’ decisions. 
In the US several experiments showed that employees attending seminars tends to save 
more (Bernheim et al, 1996).  
 
3.6.4 Marital Status 
The different saving behaviour between single and marriage couples can be explored by 
different kinds of saving account (Burton, 2001). In the UK, 43 percent of married 
couples saved in their own individual banking account compared with 56 percent who 
saved in a joint account, 2 percent have savings in both. It showed that most couples 
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would like to have independence from each other on financial matters. Moreover, 84 
percent of non married women aged between 18 and 49 indicated that they would prefer 
to make their own investment and saving decisions. Hence, marital status does not have a 
significant impact on retirement saving.  
 
3.6.5 Children   
Hurd (1987) noted that the elderly who were without children tended to save less than the  
elderly who had with children. Dependency ratio adversely affects private saving in 
developed and developing countries (Masson et al, 1995). Barro (1974) criticised the life 
cycle model which neglected intergenerational transfer from parents to children. In the 
US, high earners save about 40 percent of their income, but they may preserve some 
wealth as bequests for their children (Lusardi et al, 2001). However, retirees may 
decumulate asset slowly to ensure sufficient capital for any future uncertainty and 
advanced old age. Bequests are not therefore a reliable source of wealth, thus it is difficult 
to assess the effects of bequests on saving behaviour.  
 
3.6.6 Homeownership  
Owing a house and leaving it as a bequest tends to prevent people from saving (Mirer, 
1980). A retirement survey showed that renters tend to be poorer than homeowners 
(Gallagher and Henley, 1995). Blake (2004) argued that social security and housing 
seems to encourage consumption and reduce personal saving. Attanasio and Weber (1994) 
found that between 1983 and 1986 the increase in consumption was due to an increase in 
property price. However, future housing price is unpredictable. The Pension commission 
(2004) doubted that home ownership impacts on retirement because of the illiquidity of 
the housing asset. The life cycle model assumed that retirees can maximize their wealth 
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by selling their properties, as so to finance retirement. However, some homeowners may 
not be willing to leave their homes; even the maintenance cost is high.   
 
To sum up, the aging population and the effect of the baby boom increase the pressure to 
reform the pension system and to encourage personal saving. The MPF is a kind of 
retirement benefit and a basis of investment and wealth accumulation. However, it is 
uncertain whether the MPF will increase aggregate household savings. In spite of the 
forecast future pattern of wealth accumulation, it is still doubtful whether capital will flow 
from traditional forms of savings into the MPF scheme. Even increase in saving does not 
imply increase saving for retirement. Saving is interrelated with retirement and 
investment behaviour. Also, demographic factors will also affect this behaviour in various 
ways. The relationships between the MPF, saving and retirement is ambiguous and 
multifaceted.  
  
3.7 Hypotheses 
Elt et at (2004) conducted a survey of pension saving among Dutch households in relation 
to general characteristics such as age, gender, education and income. In addition to the 
above literature reviews, this research attempts to test whether several of these 
hypothesises are applicable to the MPF system in Hong Kong.   
Hypothesis 1: 
The people with better understanding of the MPF are thus more likely to save.    
 
Hypothesis 2: 
The implementation of MPF has a positive impact on saving.  
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Hypothesis 3: 
There is a significant relationship between the understanding of risk and saving behaviour.  
 
Hypothesis 4: 
There is a significant relationship between peoples understanding of MPF funds and 
either no additional saving, or additional voluntary saving in MPF accounts. 
  
Hypothesis 5: 
There is a significant relationship between the understanding of MPF funds and stock 
holding.   
 
Hypothesis 6: 
There is a significant relationship between the expectation of social security and the level 
of confidence to save enough for retirement.  
 
Hypothesis 7: 
Making additional voluntary contributions in the MPF account is significantly different 
across different demographic factors: 
- Gender 
- Age 
- Income 
- Education qualification 
- Marital status 
- Children 
- Homeowership 
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 Hypothesis 8: 
Saving for the short term, not for retirement is significantly different across different 
demographic factors: 
- Gender 
- Age 
- Income 
- Education qualification 
- Martial status 
- Children 
- Homeownership 
 
Hypothesis 9: 
Retirement benefit either in a lump sum or an annuity is significantly different across 
different demographic factors: 
- Gender 
- Age 
- Income 
- Education qualification 
- Martial status 
- Children 
- Homeownership 
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Chapter 4 Methodology  
4.1 Sampling 
Determining sample size is an important issue, and is used to consider how much 
sampling error may be tolerated. The smaller a sampling error which may be tolerated, 
then a larger sample will be required. A 95 percent of confidence interval is generally 
accepted in research (Bryman, 2001). However, sampling size is not easy to determine.  If 
the sample size is too large, it may waste time, resources and money. If the sample size is 
too small, it may lead to inaccurate results. Taking 10 percent of the sampling frame is 
one of the ways of calculating sample size. It may not be helpful in certain research, as the 
appropriate sample size will depend on the size of the sampling frame. For a very small 
sampling frame, a sample of 10 percent would be too small. Generally speaking, 30-50 
cases are regarded as a minimal level for meaningful statistical data analysis. 
 
This research is a cross-sectional based study to collect data at a point of time in July 
2005. Due to limited time and resources, the cluster method is used to choose target 
populations. The trading and telecommunication industries are major economic entitles in 
Hong Kong. The former generated a gross profit of HK$14,555 million and employ 
31,600 workers, the latter generated a gross profit of HK$2,203 million and employed 
168,029 workers in 2003 (Census and Statistic Department, 2005). Respondents are 
recruited from these two sectors. Quartic International Limited and Hutchison Global 
Communications Limited are selected to represent each industry. A multi-stage clustering 
sampling is used to distribute questionnaires in administrative departments. Random 
sampling enables an equal probability of each person being selected to minimize sampling 
error and bias (Babbie, 2001). Randomization improves the representativeness of this 
research. This research was limited to respondents aged 18 or above who are eligible to 
 47
meet the MPF minimum age and excluded self-employed people. This provided a highly 
cooperative and well stratified sample from different demographic backgrounds who 
participated in this research, the result can be generalised to other business sectors in 
Hong Kong.   
 
4.2 Instrumentation  
4.2.1 Research Strategy  
Quantitative research is used to develop knowledge by experimental designs such as 
quasi-experiments and correlation studies; or to generalise findings by non-experimental 
design such as surveys, questionnaires or structural interviews (Kepple, 1991; Babbie 
1990). Data collection methods can use either closed ended or open ended questions, and 
numeric or non-numeric data analysis.  In contrast, qualitative research is a way to obtain 
knowledge, which can be narrative, phenomenologies, and grounded theory and case 
studies (Strauss and Corbin 1990; Stake 1995). A mixed approach has been developed 
since 1959 to combine both qualitative and quantitative methods. For instance, a field 
method includes observations and interview to collect qualitative data integrated with 
survey in collecting quantitative data (Sieber, 1973).  Researchers gather data by asking a 
list of questions about attitudes, or collect information regarding specific behaviour. They 
can also conduct a site visit, to observe behaviour and to interview. This research is also 
aimed to test several hypothesises and correlations among saving, MPF scheme, 
investment, retirement and demographic factors. Hence, a quantitative method is adopted.  
 
4.2.2 Questionnaire  
Saving behaviour involves personal privacy, and is not easily observed. Observation may 
not be an appropriate means to collect data, and its findings are not easy to generalise. 
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Respondents may not be willing to disclose their saving habits to interviewers, who may 
tend to under-report. Hence, face to face interviews may not be applicable in this research. 
To certain extent, a questionnaire would be relatively feasible to obtain real figures. It is 
an impersonal device for securing answers to questions by using a form which the 
respondents fill in by themselves. Anonymity can be assured. Respondents would have 
more confidence to disclose their information. A self-administered questionnaire can also 
reduce interviewers’ influence leading to a biased result. Respondents find it convenient 
to fill up a questionnaire when they are free. Questionnaires are a speedy way to collect 
data within several weeks (Bryman, 2004). In addition, a closed ended questionnaire is 
used to offer a range of fixed choice. Respondents are asked to choose the one that most 
closely represents their views. Closed questions tend to be more popular than open 
questions to eliminate the problem of coding. Less work and training is required to 
administer closed ended questionnaires.   
 
However, respondents may lack spontaneity (Salant and Dillman, 1994). A follow up 
action was taken 5 days after questionnaires were distributed, in order to ensure a high 
response rate.  Closed ended questionnaires are not easy to develop, and may introduce 
bias by forcing the respondent to choose from the alternatives, or by suggesting answers 
the respondents may not have thought of otherwise. In this research, special attention has 
been paid to exhaustiveness and mutual exclusivity. Besides, respondents may not fully 
understand the questions. Several measures were taken into account to construct the 
questions. All wording must be simple and easily understood by respondents. Vague and 
ambiguous words are avoided to prevent researchers interpreting the questions based on 
their different backgrounds and points of views. The patience and ability of respondents is 
considered, in order to ensure they can read the entire questions. Lengthy questions are 
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eliminated. Indefinite words such as ‘usually’, ‘seldom’ and ‘many’ are problematic and 
are avoided due to different meanings for different respondents. Finally, double negative 
should be eliminated, such as avoid using the negative words ‘not’ in questions (Birley 
and Moreland, 1998).  
   
A cover letter was attached to the questionnaires to state clearly the research topic was 
about the Mandatory Provident Fund, and was conducted for academic purposes. A 
correspondence method was provided for any enquiry or clarification. Confidentiality was 
assured for all data.  Instructions were provided for certain questions, such as ‘to circle the 
appropriate answers’. A pilot test was conducted to improve the content of the 
questionnaire. In order to ensure respondents well understand all the questions, a back 
transition method was used by asking sample people to go through their own explaining 
of questionnaires. Several questions simplified to change from multiple choice questions 
to categorical questions, to enable respondents to answer more easily.  The structure of 
questionnaires was reorganised. An interesting and non threatening topic was arranged at 
the beginning to involve respondents involved and motivate them to cooperate in 
completing the questionnaire. Difficult questions in testing the understanding of MPF 
were arranged by the end. The most sensitive personal information was put in the last 
section. Several questions were cut to shorten the questionnaires All these revamps were 
aimed to encourage a higher response rate and to ensure an adequate response.  
 
Apart from primary data, collected data from other researchers or institutions  were used. 
These are known as secondary data. For instance, documents, journals, government 
reports, editorials and website were used as a supplement for analysis. These data 
provided a look into the past for longitudinal analysis. This method is relatively cheap in 
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cost and time. Most of these data are of high quality data conducted by professionals, i.e. 
the annual reports and information provided by the Census and Statistic Department in 
Hong Kong.  
 
4.3 Questionnaires Layout 
The questionnaire consisted of three kinds of measurements: factual data (e.g. 
demographics, savings), Likert five point continuous scales (ranging from strongly agree 
to strongly disagree) and categorical scales (Yes/ No questions) (Appendix 3). The Likert 
scale is a multiple indictor to access specific attitudes, which appears as a series of 
statements. The level of agreement ranges from point 5 (strongly agree) to point 1 
(strongly disagree). The scale is used to measure the level of intensity, frequency or 
evaluation. A computer application: SPSS 13.0 for Windows is used for analysis in 
checking internal consistency. Means, standard deviation, correlation, t-test and Chi-
square are calculated to test correlations among variables. 
 
This questionnaire was divided into dependent and independent factors. Dependent 
variables are factors that depend on the independent variables, such as outcomes of results 
of the independent variables. In this research the dependent variable is saving behaviour 
for retirement, which is affected by independent variables such as understanding of MPF, 
Investment knowledge, and retirement attitude. Independent variables are possible causes, 
influences or affect outcomes. Demographic factors are also used as independent variables 
in this research, such as gender, age, income, education qualification, marital status, 
children and residential status etc.  
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4.4 Variables  
Four variables including understanding of MPF, investment knowledge, saving behaviour 
and retirement attitude are assessed in the following ways.  
 
4.4.1 Understanding of the MPF Scheme 
To check understanding of the MPF scheme, several questions were asked such as the 
maximum amount of MPF contribution made per month and the normal retirement age to 
claim MPF. These attitudes towards MPF will be scored from 1 to 5, by evaluating 
whether MPF will be adequate to protect a comfortable retirement, and whether additional 
personal saving is needed to supplement MPF investment. 
 
4.4.2 Saving Behaviour 
One of the best predictors of saving behaviour is the total amount of money saved per 
month (Furnham, 1999). To further explore the MPF impact on saving, enquiries into 
changes in saving before and after the implementation of MPF will be made. A scoring 
question is used to ascertain whether saving is for short term purpose or for retirement.      
 
4.4.3 Investment knowledge 
To check investment knowledge, a question of whether the capital preservation fund may 
suffer loss was asked. Their attitudes toward investment will be scaled by understanding 
of MPF funds and investment information. In addition, respondents were asked whether 
they have attended MPF related seminars and what was their major source of information 
about the MPF.   
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4.4.4 Retirement Attitude 
Expectations of retirement income, retirement age, benefits in the form of lump sums or 
annuity, family support and government support were ascertained. Confidence in saving 
for a comfortable retirement life was scored. Finally, questions on expectations about the 
future of MPF contribution rate and expected retirement age were asked.  
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Chapter 5 Data Analysis 
In this chapter, a brief description on the respondents’ background will be outlined. The 
correlation among understanding of the MPF, saving behaviour, investment knowledge, 
and retirement behaviour will be analysed. Three hypotheses of additional voluntary 
saving, saving orientation and the MPF benefit payment across demographic factors will 
be tested. Finally, people’s expectation of MPF reform will be discussed.  
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In this research, 54 questionnaires were received; the response rate was 42 percent. 22 
(41.5 percent) were male, 23 (58.5 percent) were female (Figure 5.1). Most of them were 
aged between 21 and 31 (67.0 percent). 10 respondents (18.9 percent) were aged between 
31 and 40. And 2 respondents (3.8%) aged between 51 and 60, and below 20 respectively.   
Income levels 39 respondents (73.6 percent) earned less than HK$20,000. 10 respondents 
(18.9 percent) earned between $20,000 and $39,999. And the rest of 4 (7.5percent) people 
were high earners over HK$40,000. Education levels, most of them (71.7 percent) were a 
well educated with degree qualification. 41 respondents representing 77.4 percent were 
married, only 7 (13.2 percent) of them with children. The number of home owners was 18, 
about 34 percent in total.  
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Figure 5.1 Demographic Factors of Respondents 
 Number Percentage 
All 53  
Male 22 41.5 
Female 31 58.5 
 
  
Age   
<20 2   3.8 
21-30 36 67.9 
31-40 10 18.9 
41-50 3  5.7 
51-60 2  3.8 
60> 0  0 
 
  
Income   
<$20,000 39 73.6 
$20,000-$39,999 10 18.9 
>$40,000 4  7.5 
 
  
Education   
Primary or Below 3   5.7 
Secondary 12 22.6 
University or above 38 71.7 
 
  
Marital Status   
Single  41 77.4 
Married 12 22.6 
 
  
Children   
Have 7 13.2 
Don’t have 46 86.8 
 
  
Home Owners   
Yes  18  34 
No 35  66 
 
5.2 Correlation Analysis 
5.2.1 Understanding of MPF 
Retirement expectation is a factor which affects people’s retirement planning and attitudes 
(Mutran et al., 1997). In this research, a five-point Likert-type scale is used to assess 
saving, investment and retirement attitudes. Saving is probably a habit for people in Hong 
Kong. 68% respondents indicated that they saved before MPF come in, but they agreed 
that most savings are only for the short term (mean = 3.64, S.D.=1.09). This may due to a 
non-comprehensive social security system in Hong Kong, where people are self-reliant in 
financing their daily expenses. Besides, more than half of respondents (58 percent) 
admitted that MPF is inadequate to ensure a comfortable retirement. Only 9.4 percent of 
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respondents think that MPF is sufficient for a comfortable retirement. One third of 
respondents (32.1 percent) are neutral towards the adequacy of MPF. This group may not 
have an adequate understanding of the MPF, and have a neutral attitude.  Hence, it is 
interesting to explore the relationship between their understanding of the MPF and saving. 
 
Fig 5.2 Understanding of MPF  
   Normal Retirement Age
   Correct Incorrect
MPF Calculation  Correct Number 32 2 
  
Percentage 60.4% 3.8% 
  
   
 Incorrect Number 14 5 
  Percentage 26.4% 9.4% 
 
Two questions were asked to check respondents understanding of MPF. The first one is to 
ask the maximum amount of MPF contribution per month. The second one is to ask what 
is the normal retirement age to claim MPF. Fig 5.2 showed 32 respondents (60.4%) 
correctly answered both questions. An industry survey was conducted in 2000, in which 
only 40 percent of people understood the principles of the MPF (Anon. 2000). Four years 
of the implementation of the MPF, understanding of the MPF showed slight improvement. 
However, the majority of respondents indicated that they neither know how to calculate 
the amount needed to save for retirement nor how much of the MPF accrual benefit will 
be accumulated when retired, 90.0% and 94.3% respectively. It means the knowledge and 
how to calculate MPF and retirement benefit is probably inadequate.   
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Fig 5.3 The Relationship between Understanding of the MPF and Saving  
   Saving  
   Yes No 
Understanding 
of MPF 
Yes Number 18 14 
  % within group 56.3 % 43.8% 
  % of total 34.0 % 26.4 % 
     
  
 No Number 10 11 
  % within group 47.6% 52.4% 
 
 % of total 18.9% 20.8% 
 
    
Total   Number 28 25 
  Percentage 52.8% 47.2% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value d.f. Asymp Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square  .379 1 .538 
 
The amount of saving is relatively low. On average respondents only saved HK$1,646 per 
month for retirement. This amount is lower than the amount of the Comprehensive Social 
Assistance Scheme payment about HK$2,140 per month, which is only used to support 
basic daily expenditure. A chi-square is used to test the relationship between 
understanding of the MPF and saving (figure 5.3). For respondents with MPF knowledge, 
56 percent of them have savings. For those without MPF knowledge, 47.6 percent of them 
have a saving habit.  There is no significant difference between people with or without 
MPF knowledge towards saving (X2= .379, p>.05).  Hypothesis 1: the people with better 
understanding of the MPF are thus more likely to save is invalid. As mentioned above, 
only 60 percent of respondents are equipped with MPF knowledge, and 90 percent of 
them do not know how to calculate any retirement benefits required for their future.  
Hence, the low capabilities in MPF calculation and understanding of the MPF do not 
serve to encourage people to save.  
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5.2.2 Saving Behaviour 
MPF Impact on Saving Behaviour  
Fig 5.4 MPF Impacts on Saving Behaviour 
   Saving after MPF came in  
   Less Same More 
Saving habits 
before MPF 
Yes Number 10 17 9 
 
 
Percentage 27.8% 47.2% 25.0% 
 
 
% of total 18.9% 32.1% 17.0% 
 
 
    
  No Number 6 8 3 
  Percentage 35.3% 47.1% 17.6% 
 
 % of total 11.3% 15.1% 5.7% 
 
     
Total   Number 16 25 12 
  Percentage 20.2% 47.2% 22.6% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .492 2 .782 
 
Apart from understanding the MPF, the implementation of the MPF may have some 
influences on saving. However, figure 5.4 showing hypothesis 2: the implementation of 
MPF has a positive impact on saving behaviour is rejected (X2= .492, p>.05). More or less 
the same portion of respondents (47 percent), from the groups, with or without a saving 
habit, indicated that their saving habit would remain the same when the MPF came in. 
Overall 22.6 percent of respondents would save more, but 20.2 percent of respondents 
indicate that they would save less after the implementation of the MPF.  The finding 
showed that MPF has a displacement impact on saving. Some people may reduce personal 
saving to offset MPF contribution. The net impact of MPF on saving is not obvious.   
 
Correlation between the Adequacy of the MPF and Personal Saving 
 
Fig 5.5. Correlation between Personal Saving and Adequacy of MPF  
 Value Sig. Value (2-tailed) 
Person Correlation -.303 .029 
 
 58
Saving behaviour may be affected by personal expectations. An internal consistency is 
found (fig 5.5). There is a moderate correlation is between the adequacy of MPF and 
personal saving (r=-.30, p<.05). If people expect that MPF is not enough to protect 
retirement needs, they are more likely to agree personal savings are needed as a 
supplement to MPF. They admitted that additional saving is still required, even though 
MPF has already been implemented. However, only 21 percent of respondents have made 
additional voluntary contributions towards MPF accounts. The MPF account is not a 
popular saving instrument, and is not fully utilised.  
 
The Relationship between Understanding of Risk in Stock and Saving Behaviour 
 Fig. 5.6. The Relationship between Understanding of Risk and Saving Behaviour 
 Number Mean S.D. 
 With Retirement Saving 28 4.00 .171 
 Without Retirement  Saving 25 2.45 .142 
 
T-Test  
 Value Sig. Value (2-tailed) 
Independent t-test  1.945 .043 
 
A five-scale question was asked whether investing in stock is risky. Fig 5.6 shown 
hypothesis 3: there is a significant relationship between the understanding of risk and 
saving behaviour (t=1.945, p<.05). People with retirement saving (mean = 4.0) are more 
understanding of risk than those people without retirement saving (mean =2.45). The 
difference of the mean score is 1.55. People with savings tend to be more conservative 
and less willing to face an unstable retirement life. Thus, they tend to save for retirement. 
However, people without retirement savings may spend their money in other ways. This 
finding is probably consistent with the low saving rate in the USA may be due to people 
accumulating wealth through investment (Lusardi et al, 2001).  However, other factors 
like education and income may also affect the low saving rate.  
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5.2.3 Investment Knowledge 
MPF Talks/ Seminars 
Graph 5.1 The Main Information Source Consultation on MPF Investment 
 
Banks
24%
Insurance/ 
Brokers
6%
Employers
24%
Friends
16%
Never 
Consult
14%
Meida
8%
Internet
2%
MPFA
6%
 
We now consider how people decided how to invest their MPF funds. Consultation seems 
to be critically significant when it comes to MPF investment. Over 86 percent of 
respondents consulted different parties. Banks and employers were the most common 
channels for consultation. About one quarter of respondents consulted each of them 
respectively. Discussions with friends (16 percent) also play a critical role in MPF 
investment.  Insurance/ Brokers (6 percent), MPFA (6 percent), and media (8 percent) 
share the same levels of consultation. The internet was the least popular way to obtain 
MPF investment knowledge, only 2 percent of people used this medium.   
 
Fig 5.7 The Relationship between attending MPF talks and Understanding of MPF funds  
 Number Mean S.D. 
Attending MPF Talk 22 3.89 1.358 
Non attending MPF Talk 31 2.82 1.259 
 
T-Test  
 Value Sig. Value (2-tailed) 
Independent t-test 2.548 .012 
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Less than half of respondents attended MPF seminars/ talks (41.5%, n=22).  Attendees of 
MPF talks (n=22, mean = 3.89, SD=1.358) scored with better understanding of different 
kinds of MPF funds than non-attendees (n=31, mean =2.82, SD=1.259) (fig 5.7). This 
means that MPF talks tend to help the understanding of MPF funds.  In addition, there is a 
strong correlation between peoples understanding of MPF funds and either receiving clear 
MPF related information and advice (r=2.548, p<.05). Thus, MPF seminars seem to be an 
effective way of educating the public to improve their knowledge of the MPF.  
 
The Relationship between Understanding of MPF funds and making additional 
voluntary savings  
 
Fig. 5.8 The Relationship between People with/without additional voluntary saving and poor 
Understanding of MPF funds  
 Number Mean S.D. 
With Additional Voluntary Saving 11 1.27 .14 
Without Additional voluntary Saving 42 1.48 .02 
 
T-Test  
 Value Sig. Value (2-tailed) 
Independent t-test 1.206 .233 
 
The MPF is a type kind of long term investment. However, only 56 percent of 
respondents answered correctly that MPF capital preservation fund may suffer loss. It 
seems that MPF investment knowledge is not adequate. Poor understanding of investment 
issues is not only found in Hong Kong, it also happens in other countries which provide 
pension schemes (Anon., 2000). An independent-samples t-test is conducted, to test 
hypothesis 4: people understanding of MPF funds in relation to, no additional saving, or 
additional voluntary saving in MPF accounts (Fig. 5.8). There is no significant difference 
between two groups, people with additional voluntary saving (M=1.27, SD=.14) and 
people without additional voluntary saving (M=1.48, SD=.02; t=1.206, p>.05), in respect 
of their understanding of MPF funds. The result is consistent with the previous finding, 
 61
the MPF scheme is insignificant in encouraging people to save, partly due to the low level 
of understanding of MPF related issue.  
 
Stock Holders 
 
Fig. 5.9 Relationship between Stock Holders and Understanding of MPF Funds 
 Number Mean S.D. 
Stock Holders 30 2.83 .887 
Non Stock Holders 23 2.70 .998 
 
T-Test  
 Value Sig. Value (2-tailed)
Independent t-test  -.481 .633 
 
57 percent of respondents are stock holders (n=30). Their scores of understanding MPF 
funds (mean = 2.83) is slightly higher than non-stock holders (mean = 2.70, p>.05) (fig. 
5.9). Hence, there is not a statistically significant difference in the mean scores of 
understanding of MPF between stock and non-stock holders. Stock holders may tend to 
short-term speculation rather than long term investment. Thus, stock holder does not 
imply investment knowledge. MPF Funds are monitored under the MPF ordinance, which 
is not the same as the security ordinance. Thus, it is not a surprise that even stock holders 
may not fully understand MPF funding. Hence, hypothesis 5: there is a significant 
relationship between the understanding of MPF funds and stock holding. This is invalid 
(t=-.481, p>.05).  
 
5.2.4 Retirement Behaviour 
In this research, the average expected retirement age is 58. This age is lower than the MPF 
normal retirement age of 65 years. Female expected retirement age is slightly earlier than 
male by three years (male=60 years old, female=57 years old).  60 percent of respondents 
prefer retirement benefit as in lump sum rather than an annuity (n=32). They attempt to 
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enjoy more flexibility in spending their retirement benefits. This may be a risky strategy if 
the retirement benefit is not enough to cover their whole life.   
 
Less than half of respondents (43 percent, n=23) expect that their children will provide 
future financial support. The traditional custom of raising children as an insurance against 
old age, is breaking down. In Hong Kong, one person families and families without 
children are becoming more common. The average household size was 3.1 in 2004 
(Census and Statistics Department, 2004). Graph 5.2 showed that over 73 percent of 
respondents agreed that individuals should bear the greatest responsibility for retirement. 
15 percent of respondents agreed that the government should take the greatest 
responsibility. Not many people agreed that employer (6 percent) and family (6 percent) 
should take the greatest responsibility. Once they use up the benefit, 83 percent of 
respondents expect to apply for social security from the government. This means that 
people in Hong Kong attempt to be self reliant, but the responsibility of the government to 
care for the aged is still inevitable. 
 
Graph 5.2 The greatest Responsibility for Retirement 
 Myself
73%
Employer 
6%
Family
6%
Gov't 
15%
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When contemplating retirement, not many people worry about their savings. Only 15.1 
percent of respondents do not have enough confidence to save money for a comfortable 
retirement. Half of the respondents (49 percent) are confident and save enough. One third 
of respondents (35.8%) are neutral. The means score of confidence towards saving for 
retirement is 2.43 (S.D. = 1.01).  As the living standard after retirement, less than one 
third of respondents expect their retirement income will be lower than their final salary. 
64 percent of respondents expect that their retirement income will be higher or the same 
as their final salary.  
 
Fig. 5.10 The Relationship between Applying for Social Security and Confidence of Saving Enough 
for Retirement 
 Number Mean S.D. 
Attempt to Applying for Social Security 44 2.25 .149 
Do not Attempt to Applying for Social Security 9 3.33 .167 
 
T-Test  
 Value Sig. Value (2-tailed)
Independent t-test  -3.179 .003 
 
 
An independent t-test was conducted testing the relationship between people who expect 
to apply for social security, and those with enough confidence to save for their retirement. 
There is a significant difference between two groups. People who expect to apply for 
social security will have a lower level of confidence towards saving enough for retirement 
(N=44, M=2.25, SD=.149),  people who do not expect to apply for the social security 
have higher level of confidence in saving enough for retirement (N=9, M=3.33, SD=. 167) 
(fig. 5.10). Hypothesis 6 is valid that there is a significant relationship between the 
expectation to of social security and the level of confidence to save enough for retirement 
(t=-3.179, p<.05). If people do not have enough confidence, they are more likely to apply 
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for social security in their old age. Thus the burden government social security 
expenditure will be increased in the future.      
 
To sum up, the MPF seems to be ineffective in encouraging people save for retirement. 
This may be due to the fact that the scheme has only just been implemented in December 
2000. The levels of understanding of the MPF and investment knowledge are low which 
is not sufficient to promote saving and a better financial preparation for retirement. This 
research showed an important finding that of the low level of confidence to save enough 
for retirement (m=2.43), and will be more likely to cause people to apply for social 
security. Hence, it is critical to explore further whether demographic factors have 
significant influence on three particular aspects including voluntary contribution, saving 
purpose, and forms of retirement benefits.  
 
5.3 Demographic Analysis  
5.3.1 Additional Voluntary Saving 
According to these findings, voluntary saving is not popular, only 20 percent of 
respondents have made a voluntary contribution (n=11). Hence, it is critical to identify 
which demographic factors affects people making voluntary contributions, in order to 
design more attractive and appropriate voluntary saving products.  
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Gender 
Fig. 5.11 The Relationship between Additional Voluntary Contribution and Gender 
   Additional Voluntary 
Contribution   
   Yes No 
Gender Male Number 5 17 
 
 
% within gender 22.7% 77.3% 
 
 
% of total 9.4% 32.1% 
 
 
   
  Female Number 6 25 
 
 
% within gender 19.4% 50.6% 
 
 % of total 11.3% 47.2% 
 
    
Total   Number 11 42 
  Percentage 20.8% 79.2% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value d.f. Asymp Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .089 1 .765 
 
Gender is not a significant difference in additional voluntary distribution (X2= .089, p>.05) 
(fig 5.11). Nowadays, both males and females in Hong Kong probably enjoy equal status 
in education and work. Their levels of income and consumption are not in greatly 
difference. The low level of voluntary contributions may be due to various factors other 
than gender. There may be a lack of incentive to make a voluntary contribution, since 
only the mandatory contribution is exempt from tax, with a maximum limit of $12,000 
per year. In addition, Hong Kong is an international financial centre. There are lots of 
investment products such as bonds, funds and securities. People in Hong Kong enjoy 
choice of investment. The MPF additional voluntary saving account seems to be less 
attractive than other investment instruments.   
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Age 
Fig. 5.12 The Relationship between Additional Voluntary Contribution and Age 
   Additional Voluntary 
Contribution   
   Yes No 
Age <20 Number 0 2 
 
 
% within age group 0% 100% 
 
 
% of total 0% 3.8% 
 
 
   
   21-30 Number 1 35 
 
 
% within age group 2.8% 97.2% 
  
% of total 1.9% 66.0% 
  
   
 31-40 Number 5 5 
  
% within age group 50.0% 50.0% 
  
% of total 9.4% 9.4% 
  
   
 41-50 Number 3 0 
  
% within age group 100% 0% 
  
% of total 5.7% 0% 
  
   
 51-60 Number 2 0 
 
 % within age group 100.0% 0% 
 
 % of total 3.8% 0% 
 
    
Total   Number 11 42 
  Percentage 20.8% 79.2% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value d.f. Asymp Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 31.889 4 .000 
 
Age groups has a significant difference towards additional voluntary contribution (X2= 
31.889, p<.05) (fig.5.12). The two youngest groups (below twenty years old, and between 
21 and 30 years old), are the least likely to make voluntary contribution. This may due to 
low starting salaries, so they may not have much disposable income to make voluntary 
contribution.  It is also explained by the life cycle model that youngsters are more likely 
to spend their money on studies, entertainment and housing rather than to save. The 
highest saving group is the middle aged between 31 and 40. At this stage, salary probably 
increases more rapidly than at other stages. Hence, they are more likely to have 
disposable income to devote to voluntary saving. The finding is consistent with Guariglia 
and Markose (2000) who stated that there is a strong positive relationship between this 
middle aged group and saving. They are more likely to make voluntary savings to 
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eliminate income shocks. The basic principle of the life time model is applicable to Hong 
Kong, saving increase is related to age. The peak time of making voluntary contribution 
arises earlier in the middle age rather than the life cycle theory assumed before retirement.  
 
Income 
Fig. 5.13 The Relationship between Additional Voluntary Contribution and Income 
   Additional Voluntary Contribution   
   Yes No 
Income <HK$20,000 Number 10 29 
 
 
% within  income group  25.6% 74.4% 
 
 
% of total 18.9% 54.7% 
 
 
   
  HK$20,000 - Number 0 10 
 HK$39,999 % within income group 0% 100% 
  
% of total 0% 18.9% 
  
   
 >HK$40,000 Number 1 3 
 
 % within income group 25.0% 75.0% 
 
 % of total 1.9% 5.7% 
 
    
Total   Number 11 42 
  Percentage 20.8% 79.2% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value d.f. Asymp Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.299 2 .199 
 
Various income levels are not a significantly different in making additional voluntary 
contributions (X2= 3.299, p>.05) (fig.5.13). Thus the hypothesis that there is a significant 
difference in making voluntary contribution across different age groups is rejected. Since 
the MPF has only operated for four years. Respondents tend to take a “wait and see 
approach” regarding additional voluntary contributions. Only one out of four respondents 
from the high income group (>HK$40,000) has made voluntary contributions. They may 
have already been a target customer for banks and financial institutions to promote 
different investment products before the implementation of the MPF. Additional 
voluntary saving is relatively less attractive for them compared with other means of 
investment. As for the low income group (HK$<20,000), they may be excluded from the 
products of the financial companies. The low earners are less likely to receive marketing 
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material and to access financial institutions. Thus, voluntary contributions are not a 
suitable option for them.    
 
Education  
Fig. 5.14 Relationship between Additional Voluntary Contribution and Education  
   Additional Voluntary 
Contribution   
   Yes No 
Education Degree Holders Number 8 30 
 
 
% within education 21.1% 78.0% 
 
 
% of total 15.1% 56.5% 
 
 
   
   Non-degree 
Holders 
Number 3 12 
  % within education 20% 80% 
 
 % of total 5.7% 22.6% 
 
    
 Total Number 11 42 
  Percentage 20.8% 79.2% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value d.f. Asymp Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square  .007 1 .932 
 
The proportion of degree holders who made additional voluntary contributions is not 
significantly different from the proportion of non-degree holders that made contributions 
(X2= .007, p>.05) (fig. 5.14). The hypothesis that making additional voluntary 
contributions towards the MPF account is significantly different across differently 
educated people is not valid. It may be true that education is not a significant difference in 
making contributions. MPF is a kind of long term investment. Even degree holders may 
not fully understand investment issues and the importance of early and continual 
retirement saving. This result is consistent with the previous finding that nearly half of 
respondents could not answer correctly that the capital preservation fund may suffer loss. 
And over 90 percent of respondents do no know how to calculate savings needed for 
retirement. Thus, MPF education is needed regardless of peoples educational levels.  
 
Marital Status 
Fig. 5.15 Relationship between Additional Voluntary Contribution and Marital Status  
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   Additional Voluntary Contribution   
   Yes No 
Marital Status Single Number 5 36 
 
 
% within marriage status 12.2% 87.8% 
 
 
% of total 9.4% 67.9% 
 
 
   
  Married  Number 6 6 
  % within marriage status  50% 50% 
 
 % of total 11.3% 11.3% 
 
    
Total   Number 11 42 
  Percentage 20.8% 79.2% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value d.f. Asymp Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square  8.067 1 .005 
 
There is a statistically difference between marital status and additional voluntary 
contributions (X2= 8.067, p<.05) (fig.5.15). Single people are less likely to make 
additional voluntary contributions. Only 12 percent of single people have made voluntary 
contributions, in contrast 50 percent of married people have made voluntary contributions. 
This means that people who are married are more prepared to plan for their retirement. 
And that single respondents without family responsibilities are less likely to make 
voluntary contributions.  Especially, the young single person may think retirement saving 
is an issue for the distant future. This is explained by the life cycle model that youngsters 
have immediate goals to achieve regarding studies, marriage and home purchase, and are 
thus less likely to save for retirement. 
 
Children 
Fig. 5.16 Relationship between Additional Voluntary Contribution and Children 
   Additional Voluntary Contribution   
   Yes No 
Children Have Number 6 1 
 
 
% within children 85.7% 14.3% 
 
 
% of total 11.3% 1.9% 
 
 
   
  Do not have Number 5 41 
  % within children 10.9% 89.1% 
 
 % of total 9.4% 77.4% 
 
    
Total   Number 11 42 
  Percentage 20.8% 79.2% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
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 Value d.f. Asymp Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square  20.602 1 .000 
 
The proportion of people who have children and who made additional voluntary 
contributions is significantly different from the proportion of people without children who 
made contributions (X2= 20.602, p<.05) (fig. 5.16). People having children (85.9 percent) 
are more likely to make additional voluntary contributions than those without children 
(10.9 percent). As mentioned above, marital status is a significant factor influencing 
voluntary contribution. This could be further explained as married respondents with 
children prefer to protect a more stable family life. Additionally, the average household 
size in Hong Kong has reduced from 3.4 in 1991 to 3.1 in 2004 (Census and Statistics 
Department, 2001). This means many families have on average only one child. Parental 
expectation of family size has changed. Parents do not rely on one child to keep them in 
retirement. Hence, people with a small family attempt to plan for their own retirements by 
making voluntary contributions. 
 
 
 
 
Homeownership 
Fig. 5.17 Relationship between Additional Voluntary Contribution and Home Owners   
   Additional Voluntary Contribution   
   Yes No 
Home Owners Yes Number 1 17 
 
 
% within home owners 5.6% 94.4% 
 
 
% of total 1.9% 32.1% 
 
 
   
   No Number 10 25 
 
 
% within home owners 28.6% 71.4% 
 
 % of total 18.9% 47.2% 
 
    
Total   Number 11 42 
  Percentage 20.8% 79.2% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value d.f. Asymp Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square  3.829 1 .05 
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There is a significant difference in home ownership and additional voluntary contribution 
(X2= 3.829, p=.05) (fig. 5.17). Home owners are less likely to make voluntary 
contributions. About 2 percent of home owners have made voluntary contributions, while 
about 29 percent of non home owners have made voluntary contributions. In Hong Kong, 
the relative property price is one of the highest  in the world, housing expenses accounts 
for 32 percent of average monthly household expenditure such as mortgage, rate and 
management fee (Census and Statistics Department, 2001). Hence, home owners are less 
likely to have disposable income available for making voluntary contributions.  
 
5.3.2 Saving Orientation 
In this part, saving orientation will be tested to see if there is a significant difference 
across different demographic factors. A five scale score is used to ask respondents 
whether saving is for the short-term, but not for retirement. Score 5 implies saving for 
short time, while score 1 implies saving for retirement.  
 
Gender 
Fig. 5.18 Relationship between Saving Orientation and Gender 
 Number Mean S.D. 
Male 22 2 .873 
Female 31 2.52 .996 
 
T-Test  
 Value d.f. Sig. Value (2-tailed)
Independent t-test   -1.955 51 .056 
 
An independent-samples t-test is conducted to compare the significant difference in the 
mean of short term saving scores for males and female. There is no significant difference 
in scores for males (M=2, SD=.873) and females (M=2.52, SD=.996; t=-1.955, p>.05) (fig. 
5.18).  The hypothesis that saving for the short term, not for retirement is significantly 
different across gender is not valid. This finding is consistent with the previous finding 
 72
that there is no significant difference in making voluntary contributions between men and 
women.  
 
Age 
Fig. 5.19 Relationship between Saving Orientation and Age 
  Number Mean S.D. 
Age <20 2 4.00 .000 
 21-30 36 2.39 .964 
 31-40 10 2.10 .738 
 41-50 3 1.33 .577 
 51-60 2 1.50 .707 
 Total 53 2.30 .972 
 
ANOVA 
 d.f. F Sig. Value (2-tailed)
Between groups 4 3.277   .019 
 
 
   Multiple Comparisons  
(I) age (J) age 
Mean Difference
 (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
   
<20 21-30 1.611 .652 .114 
  31-40 1.900 .695 .063 
  41-50 2.667(*) .819 .017 
  51-60  2.500 .897 .056 
  
   
21-30 <20 
-1.611 .652 .114 
  31-40 .289 .321 .895 
  41-50 1.056 .539 .302 
  51-60 .889 .652 .653 
  
   
31-40 <20 
-1.900 .695 .063 
  21-30 
-.289 .321 .895 
  41-50 .767 .590 .693 
  51-60 .600 .695 .909 
     
41-50 <20 -2.667(*) .819 .017 
  21-30 
-1.056 .539 .302 
  31-40 
-.767 .590 .693 
  51-60 
-.167 .819 1.000 
  
   
51-60 <20 
-2.500 .897 .056 
  21-30 
-.889 .652 .653 
  31-40 -.600 .695 .909 
  41-50 .167 .819 1.000 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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A one-way between-group ANOVA analysis of variance is conducted to explore the 
impact of age on levels of saving orientation (fig. 5.19). There is a statistically significant 
difference at the p<.05 level in a five-point score for the different age groups (F=3.277, 
p<.05). Despite reaching statistical significance, the actual difference mean scores 
between age groups are relatively large, since the eta squared is .21. Cohen (1988) stated 
that the value of eta sqared greater than .14 is a large effect size.  Respondents who are 
younger than 20 years old are significantly different from the age group between 41 and 
50. The youngest age group is the most likely to save for short term goal (M=4, S.D.=.00). 
The short term saving mean scores reduces along with the increase with age until the age 
of 50 years old. It is consistent with the life cycle hypothesis that youngsters are more 
likely to spend rather than to save. People in Hong Kong of this age group are more 
concerned about saving for marriage and home purchase (Siu, 2001). The mean score 
slightly increases for those aged between 51 and 60. People reaching retirement age may 
have less financial burdens from their families and children, who enjoy more flexibilities 
in consumption at this stage.  
 
Income 
Fig. 5.20 Relationship between Saving Orientation and Income 
  Number Mean S.D. 
Income <HK$20,000 39 2.31 1.004 
 HK$20,000 - HK$39,999 10 2.40 .996 
 >HK$ 40,000 4 2.00 .816 
Total  53 2.30 .972 
 
ANOVA 
 d.f. Value Sig. Value (2-tailed) 
ANOVA 2   .237 .790 
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  Multiple Comparisons 
(I) income (J) income 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
<HK$20,000 HK$20,000 - HK$39,999 -.092 .350 .962 
  >HK$ 40,000 .308 .518 .824 
  
   
 HK$20,000 -HK$39,999  <HK$20,000 .092 .350 .962 
  
 >HK$ 40,000 .400 .584 .773 
 
 
   
>HK$ 40,000  <HK$20,000 -.308 .518 .824 
  
 HK$20,000 - HK$39,999 -.400 .584 .773 
 
 
Different levels of income earned is not a significant difference towards the saving for a 
short-term goal (F=.237, p>.05) (fig. 5.20). Respondents tend to be neutral about whether 
their saving is for short term or for retirement (M=2.3). This may be due to the economic 
downturn after the Asian economic crisis; the unemployment rate has sharply increased 
from 2.3 percent in 1997 to 5.7 percent in 2005 (Census and Statistic Department, 2005). 
Even high earners worry about losing their jobs. Thus, employees have to save against 
both short term and long term uncertainties. Hence, education to save for the long term 
and to invest for a better return is required, in particular they need a hedge against of 
inflation.  
 
Education 
Fig. 5.21  Relationship between Saving Orientation and Education  
 Number Mean S.D. 
Degree Holders 38 2.34 1.047 
Non Degree Holders 15 2.20 .775 
 
T-Test  
 d.f. Value Sig. Value (2-tailed)
Independent t-test 51 .476  .636 
 
The level of education is an insignificant difference towards saving orientation (F=.476, 
p>.05) (fig.5.21). This finding is consistent with the result mentioned above education 
level is not a significant difference in making additional voluntary contribution. Even 
degree holders do not have a better understanding of MPF and investment issues than 
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non-degree holders. In addition, education in Hong Kong has changed from an elite 
education system to general education system; over 66 percent of youngsters can now 
achieve tertiary education.  Hence, the difference between degree and non degree holders 
towards saving orientations may become anomalous.    
 
Marital Status  
Fig. 5.22 Relationship between Saving Orientation and Marital Status  
 Number Mean S.D. 
Single 41 2.39 .997 
Married 12 2.00 .853 
 
T-Test  
 d.f. Value Sig. Value (2-tailed)
Independent t-test 51 1.259   .225 
 
An independent t-test was used to test the different between single and married people in 
the mean of saving scores. There is no significant difference between the two groups 
(t=1.259, p>.05) (fig 5.22). This can be explained by similar reasons as mention above, 
economic downturn affects saving orientation regardless of marital status. Single persons 
have difficulty in saving enough for marriage. The marriage age was 30 years old for 
males and 27 for females in 1996, increasing to 31 for males and 28 for females in 2004 
(Census and Statistic Department, 2005).  Economic recession seems to be a barrier to 
marriage. Hong Kong’s people are facing financial pressure from the external business 
environment, so they have to save without either a clear short term or a long term purpose.  
 
Children 
Fig. 5.23 Relationship between Saving Orientation and Having Children 
  Number Mean S.D. 
Children Have 7 1.57 .535 
 
Do not have 46 2.41 .979 
 
T-Test  
 d.f. Value Sig. Value (2-tailed)
Independent t-test 51   -2.212 .031 
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The proportion of people with children is significantly different from the proportion of 
people without children regarding saving in the short term (t=-2.212, p<.05) (fig. 5.23). 
People without children (M=2.41, SD=.979) are more likely to save for the short term, 
whilst people with children are more likely to save for retirement (M=1.57, SD=.535). 
The magnitude of the difference in the mean is moderate (eta square =.088).  Bring up 
children is a long term commitment, so respondents with children are less likely to save 
for short term goals such as travelling and car purchases. Parents are now less likely to 
rely on their children to support their retirement, and now have their own long term plans 
for the future. This is also consistent with the previous finding that parents are more likely 
to make additional voluntary contributions. Conversely, people without children are 
facing relatively less financial pressure. They are more likely to spend their savings in 
fulfilling their short-term needs.  
 
Homeownership 
Fig. 5.24 Relationship between Savings for short term and Home Owners   
  Number Mean S.D. 
Home Owners 18 2.78 .943 
Non Home Owners 35 2.06 .906 
 
T-Test  
 d.f. Value Sig. Value (2-tailed)
Independent t-test 51   2.706 .009 
 
There is a significant difference between the proportion of home owners (M=2.78, 
SD=.943) saving for short term goals and the proportion of non home owners (M=2.06, 
SD=.906, t=2.705, p<.05) (fig.5.24). Home owners are more likely to save for short term 
goal than non home owners, the mean score difference is about 0.78. The size of this 
effect size is moderate (Eta squred= .13).  Since housing costs account for a third of total 
expenditure, home owners are less likely to worry about housing expenses in old age. 
Their saving tends to be short-term oriented. For instance, home owners are more likely to 
decorate their houses. Non-home owners without capital have to save more for their 
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retirement. Especially, they attempt to conserve more savings for their retirement to 
finance affordable housing in the future. Therefore, they perceive the need to pay rental 
for life whilst home owners discharge their mortgages after a period of years.   
 
5.3.3 MPF Benefit Payment 
MPF is repayable in a lump sum upon reaching retirement age at 65. When giving a 
choice of MPF payment either in a lump sum or an annuity to respondents, 38 percent of 
them prefer an annuity. The annuity is calculated by the insurance company or other 
financial institutions. For example, they would offer a lower annuity to a female than a 
male (for a given lump sum) to reflect females’ longer life expectancy. In this section, 
demographic factors in relation to forms of retirement benefit payment will be analysed.  
 
 
Gender 
Fig. 5.25 Relationship between MPF payment and Gender 
   MPF Payment 
   Lump Sum Annuity 
Gender Male Number 20 2 
 
 
% within gender 90.9% 9.1 
 
 
% of total 37.7% 3.8% 
 
 
   
  Female Number 13 18 
 
 
% within gender 41.0% 58.1% 
 
 % of total 24.5% 34.0% 
 
    
Total   Number 33 20 
  Percentage 62.3% 37.7% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value d.f. Asymp Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square  11.134 1 .001 
 
The proportion of males preferring a lump sum is significantly different from the 
proportion of females who prefer a lump sum (X2= 11.134, p<.05) (fig. 5.25). 91 percent 
of men and 42 percent of women choose a lump sum. This can be explained as females 
live longer than males.  Life expectancy for females was 85 years old and for males, was 
79 years old in 2004 (Census and Statistics Department, 2005).  58 percent of females 
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choose annuity to cover for their whole life. In contrast, 90 percent of males choose a 
lump sum, which implies that they are more likely to arrange retirement benefits by 
themselves.   
 
Age 
Fig 5.26 Relationship between MPF Payment and Age 
   MPF Payment 
   Lump Sum Annuity 
Age <20 Number 1 1 
 
 
% within age group 50.0% 50.0% 
 
 
% of total 1.9% 1.9% 
 
 
   
   21-30 Number 21 15 
 
 
% within age group 58.3% 41.7% 
  
% of total 39.6% 28.3% 
  
   
 31-40 Number 9 1 
  
% within age group 90.0% 10.0% 
  
% of total 17.0% 1.9% 
  
   
 41-50 Number 1 2 
  
% within age group 33.3% 66.7% 
  
% of total 1.9% 3.8% 
  
   
 51-60 Number 1 1 
 
 % within age group 50.0% 50.0% 
 
 % of total 1.9% 1.9% 
 
    
Total   Number 33 20 
  Percentage 62.3% 37.7% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value d.f. Asymp Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.836 4 .305 
 
There is no significant different among different age groups towards payment of MPF in 
lump sum or annuity (X2= 4.836, p>.05) (fig. 5.26). This may be due to the fact that MPF 
benefits have only accumulated for four years, the amount of accrued benefits between 
various age groups are similar. Thus, there are no apparent preferences towards MPF 
payment in a lump sum or in an annuity. In long run, the MPF contribution will 
accumulate for several decades, the amount of accrued benefit will be large enough to 
induce a different preference towards MPF payments for different age groups.   
 
 79
Income 
Fig. 5.27 Relationship between MPF Payment and Income 
   MPF Payment 
   Lump Sum Annuity 
Income <HK$20,000 Number 29 10 
 
 
% within  income group  74.4% 25.6% 
 
 
% of total 54.7% 18.9% 
 
 
   
  >HK$20,000  Number 4 10 
 
 
% within income group 28.6% 71.4% 
  
% of total 7.5% 18.9% 
  
   
Total   Number 33 20 
  Percentage 62.3% 37.7% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value d.f. Asymp Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.287 1 .002 
 
Different income groups exposed a significant difference towards preference of MPF 
benefit payment (X2= 10.287, p<.05) (fig. 5.27).  The lowest income group with less than 
HK$20,000 per month are more likely to choose a lump sum payment, 74 percent of them 
expect to have a lump sum. This may be due to their disposable incomes being relatively 
low. They would enjoy more flexibility in deploying lump sum benefits when retired. The 
higher income group monthly salary above HK$20,000 expect to have an annuity, since 
they tends to have a longer life expectancy. Hence, most of them prefer annuity for a life 
long coverage. In addition, the maximum amount of the MPF contribution is HK$1,000 
per month, which is relatively insignificant for high earners. The way that MPF payments 
impact on their retirement life is relatively less critical.    
 Education  
Fig. 5.28 Relationship between MPF Payment and Education  
   MPF Payment 
   Lump Sum Annuity 
Education Degree Holders Number 24 14 
 
 
% within education 63.2% 36.8% 
 
 
% of total 45.3% 26.4% 
 
 
   
   Non-degree Holders Number 9 6 
  % within education 60.0% 40.0% 
 
 % of total 17.0% 11.3% 
 
    
 Total Number 33 20 
  Percentage 62.3% 37.7% 
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 Chi-Square Tests 
 Value d.f. Asymp Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square  .046 1 .831 
 
The level of education is not a significant difference regarding MPF payment in lump sum 
or annuity (X2= .046, p>.05) (fig. 5.28). As mention previously, retirement and investment 
issues are contained to professional knowledge. Neither degree nor non-degree holders 
have sufficient knowledge and understanding towards MPF. Hence, a significant 
difference between two groups toward MPF payment cannot be determined. Hence, 
public education about the MPF should be provided to all people regardless the level of 
their education.  
 
Martial Status 
Fig. 5.29 Relationship between MPF Payment and Marital Status  
   MPF Payment 
   Lump Sum Annuity 
Marital 
Status 
Single Number 23 18 
 
 
% within martial status 56.1% 43.9% 
 
 
% of total 43.4% 34.0% 
 
 
   
   
Married  
Number 10 2 
  % within martial status  83.3% 16.7% 
 
 % of total 18.9% 3.8% 
 
    
Total   Number 33 20 
  Percentage 62.3% 37.7% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value d.f. Asymp Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square  2.931 1 .087 
 
There is no statistically difference between marital status and MPF payment (X2= 2.931, 
p>.05) (fig. 5.29). Apart from the changes from extended family to nuclear family, the 
traditional family bond is weakening. The number of divorces increased five times from 
2,062 cases in 1981 to 32,869 cases in 2001 (Census and Statistic Department, 2003). 
People in Hong Kong are losing confidence in marriage, and thus are less likely to rely on 
their families.  The influence of marital status on MPF payment is not obvious.    
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Children 
Fig. 5.30 The Relationship between MPF Payment and Children 
   MPF Payment 
   Lump Sum Annuity  
Children Have Number 7 0 
 
 
% within children 100% 0% 
 
 
% of total 13.2% .0% 
 
 
   
  Do not have Number 26 20 
  % within children 56.5% 43.5% 
 
 % of total 49.1% 37.7% 
 
    
Total   Number 33 20 
  Percentage 62.3% 37.7% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value d.f. Asymp Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square  4.888 1 .027 
 
The proportion of people with children who choose a lump sum is significantly different 
from the proportion of people without children who choose a lump sum (X2= 4.888, p<.05) 
(fig. 5.30). All respondents with children prefer a lump sum, while only 56.5 percent of 
respondents without children choose a lump sum. The life cycle hypothesis suggested that 
by the time of retirement, individuals’ wealth will maximize when the children grow up. 
Hence, people with children are more likely to choose a lump sum benefit, so as to reserve 
some benefits as bequests for children. Though people’s reliance on the family is not 
strong, people without children are more likely to prefer an annuity, since they do not 
have children as a buffer to offer support in their retirement. Having children seems to be 
an influential factor towards additional voluntary saving, saving orientation and MPF 
payments.  
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Homeownership 
Fig. 5.31 Relationship between MPF Payment and Home Owners    
   MPF Payment 
   Lump Sum Annuity 
Home Owners Yes Number 10 8 
 
 
% within home owners 55.6% 44.4% 
 
 
% of total 18.9% 15.1% 
 
 
   
   No Number 23 12 
 
 
% within home owners 65.7% 34.3% 
 
 % of total 43.4% 22.6% 
 
    
Total   Number 33 20 
  Percentage 62.3% 37.7% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value d.f. Asymp Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square  .522 1 .470 
 
There is no significant different between home owners and non home owners regarding 
MPF payment   (X2= .552, p>.05) (fig. 5.31). Owning a property seems to be one of the 
factors in securing retirement. Home owners are relatively more secure, they do not have 
a distinct preference for receiving the MPF benefit in either a lump sum or an annuity. 
Non home owners are relatively more concerned about saving enough for their retirement. 
They need to be more financially prudent rather than to rely on the benefit payment alone 
for a secure retirement. Hence, neither MPF payments in lump sum nor an annuity is 
significant for home owners or non home owners.  
 
 
5.4 The Future of MPF 
5.4.1 Expectation of MPF Development  
After analysing factors affecting saving, this section will examine people’s expectations 
of MPF development. It is crucial as a reference for future reform. The MPF scheme is a 
new retirement benefit system in Hong Kong, which is under review by the MPFA. In the 
previous few years, some amendments have been made. For instance, the minimum 
relevant income level has been adjusted from HK$4,000 to HK$5,000 per month in 2003. 
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Employees and self-employed person earning less that the minimum level are exempted 
from contributions to alleviate their financial burdens. In this research several questions 
have been asked regarding future development of the MPF. However, respondents were 
not very supportive towards the expansion of the scheme including coverage, contribution 
rate and age of contribution. Under the existing MPF schemes, certain groups are 
exempted from contribution such as domestic helpers, hawkers and housewives. For a 
comprehensive retirement scheme, these vulnerable groups need to be protected by the 
scheme. However, only 43 percent of respondents support extended the coverage of the 
scheme to these groups. About a third of people disagreed with covering them. 26 percent 
of respondents are neutral towards the extension of coverage. People in Hong Kong seem 
apathetic about protecting low income groups and unpaid housewives, these groups of 
people also serve to help society develop. Their rights and benefits seem to be neglected. 
The MPF may further intensify exclusion of the poor from retirement protection.  
 
5.4.2 Reversing the Early Retirement Trend  
In the past 20 years, the labour participation rate among elderly has been dropping in 
OECD countries, which has induced a higher cost of social welfare to cater for the 
unemployed elderly. Thus government policy has now to focus on how to encourage the 
older worker to be active in the labour market. For instance, the New Deal 50-plus and 
the age discrimination act in the UK; gradual retirement and wage subsidies for the older 
employees in Finland and Germany, and job seeking advice in Netherlands. All these 
measures aim to encourage the older worker to remain in the labour market so as to 
reduce the burden on social welfare (Taylor, 2001). In this research, the average expected 
retirement age is at 58 years old. Nearly all respondents (98 percent) do not expect to 
continue with MPF contributions when over 65. Raising the MPF contribution age may 
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not be feasible to solve the demographic problem. It is doubtful whether people at this age 
are still required in his work place. In Hong Kong, the peak unemployment rate reached 
5.7 percent in 2005, even middle age group cannot find a job easily (Cense and Statistics 
Department, 2005). If individuals do not expect to work longer, they may consider 
increasing the contribution rate. Otherwise, the living standard after retirement will fall.  
 
The MPF contribution rate is 10 percent in total from employers and employees. The rate 
is relatively low compared with other Asian countries. In China, the contribution rate is 
about 25 percent of income (Asher M.F. and Newman D.D. 2002). In Singapore, the 
central provident fund (CPF) contribution rate is about 40 percent. In Malaysia, the 
Employee Provident Fund (EPF) is about 23 percent. (Lindeman, 2002).  In the Asia 
Pacific Region, the average contribution rate is about 14 percent of income (Asher M.F. 
and Newman D.D. 2002).  In this research, more than half of respondents (57 percent) 
expect the MPF contribution rate will have to increase in the next 10 years. This is 
consistent with the finding that 58 percent of respondents agreed with the inadequacy of 
MPF. The MPFA should review the contribution rate in order to ensure that the MPF can 
protect peoples for retirement. Though there would be strong opposition from employers. 
If MPF is insufficient to provide adequately for retirement, people will have no option but 
to rely on social security. When the government faces higher expenditure, higher tax rates 
will become unavoidable. Finally, employers will share the cost burden, either through 
their share of direct taxation or through an increasing share of the costs of the MPF 
scheme.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
To a certain extent, the MPF seems to be ineffective in promoting a saving culture. Due to 
the low level of MPF and investment knowledge, poor understanding of MPF, this does 
not encourage to encourage saving for retirement. Even though individuals realise that the 
MPF is inadequate to protect retirement, and they agree retirement protection is a personal 
responsibility. However, respondents expected to apply for social security as a last resort, 
especially for those who have too low a confidence to save enough for retirement. Hence, 
it is important to investigate whether demographic factors have a significant effect on the 
economy, savings, and retirement, so as to formulate more effective measures in dealing 
with this problem more popularly called the demographic time bomb.  
 
This research showed that having children is one of the most critical factors which 
encourage additional voluntary contributions and long term saving. Parents are more 
likely to prefer a lump sum MPF payment. Home ownership and age also have a 
substantial influence on voluntary contribution and saving orientation, but its impact on 
MPF payment is insignificant. Gender and level of income only have significant impacts 
on the method of MPF payment. Marital status is of only limited influence on the 
voluntary contribution aspect. The level of education has no significance in either 
payment method or savings strategy. It is an interesting finding that gender and marital 
status play a limited impact, this may be due to the social culture of female reliance on the 
family is declining. Most individuals now enjoy more equal opportunity in Hong Kong.  
 
On considering future development the MPF scheme is inadequate and cannot save 
enough for peoples retirement, especially for the low income group. Most respondents do 
not support increased coverage, higher contribution rates and increased age of 
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contribution. Government intervention may be needed to implement MPF reform; 
otherwise the living standards and the retired will fall to an unacceptable level.   
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Chapter 6 Discussion  
 
The advantages of the MPF scheme will be firstly explained in this chapter. However, 
there are several drawbacks with the MPF schemes such as exclusion of the poor, 
investment returns and charges, and the lack of competition. The concluding section will 
recommend providing more education, information and investment instruments, in order 
to encourage people to save. In the long run, the MPF should change in tandem with 
social security reform.  
  
6.1 Advantages of the MPF 
6.1.1 Equitability 
MPF is equitable to each member, since their amount of accrued benefit is based on the 
contributions made. This is a positive incentive which should encourage scheme members 
to make additional voluntary contributions in order to prepare for a better retirement. By 
the end of March 2005, HK$2,368 million of voluntary contribution has been made 
(MPFA, 2005).  
 
6.1.2 Cost-effectiveness  
MPF schemes are operated by various trustees in a freely competitive market, which 
should be an incentive to efficiency and lower cost. The MPFA plays a regulatory role in 
ensuring the MPF system operates effectively and takes advantage of economic of scale 
(MPFA, 2002). Scheme members can enjoy benefits from lower administration costs 
which are about 2 percent per year (Ho, 1997). 
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6.1.3 Benefits to Hong Kong’s Economy 
The MPF contributions support the financial sector in Hong Kong. The amount of annual 
contributions is about HK$10 billion. After 30 years, the amount will increase to HK$60 
billion annually (MPFA, 2002). This substantial amount of funding has not previously 
been available before the implementation of the MPF. The retirement assets facilitate the 
development of Hong Kong’s financial markets. Particularly the demand for bonds and 
equities will increase. All the MPF’s are managed by approved trustees. The MPF assets 
are protected and kept by qualified custodians, independent from employers, trustees and 
services providers. These increasing assets increase the demand for security, investment 
and scheme administration services. The MPF market attracts both local and international 
service providers. Their participation further improves the standard of pension services.  
 
6.1.4 Appropriate for Hong Kong 
Hong Kong is an international and renowned financial centre, which is effectively 
regulated and highly trusted by investors. The Basic law provided a legal foundation to 
implement the MPF scheme. The Law guarantees the system in Hong Kong will remain 
unchanged for 50 years since 1997. A privately managed retirement scheme is the most 
appropriate to operate in a well established and stable environment.   
 
6.2 Criticisms of MPF schemes 
6.2.1 Exclusion of the Poor 
The MPF may and does lead to financial exclusion for certain groups including the low 
income group, self employed, exempted person and unemployed.  In the UK, individuals 
cannot access financial services through appropriate means and channels such as face to 
face services and internet banking (Devlin, 2005). Low income people who earn less than 
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HK$5,000/ month are exempted from contribution and therefore benefits, since the 
payments may be unaffordable. Self-employed persons cannot benefit significantly from 
the scheme due to their small contributions. A low level of contribution does little to 
improve lifetime retirement funding. Thus, the MPF neither supports retirement, nor 
improves the current living standard. Conversely, it may detract from their standard of 
living both now and in the future (Ho et al., 2004).  
 
According to the MPF Ordinance, certain workers are excluded from the scheme 
including domestic helpers, hawkers, employees working fewer 60 days and workers aged 
below 18 and over 65.  About 1.2 percent of employees, those aged below 18 and over 65 
are exempted from the scheme. In addition, married women have a disincentive to stay at 
work and be covered by the MPF scheme as the social security system does not provide 
adequate child and old people care whilst the women are at work (Chow, 2002).  
Therefore, the employment based MPF system cannot protect economically inactive 
participants. It is not a risk-pooling approach to redistribute wealth. Retirees rely on their 
own contribution rather than share the entire social contribution. The market based MPF 
scheme adversely selects and discriminates against workers and non workers, and 
between the young and older workforce (Chan, 2003).  
 
6.2.2 Lack of Incentive  
In the late 70s the British government cultivated a savings-friendly environment by tax 
incentives to encourage more saving in pension accounts.  However, the tax advantage of 
the MPF is not attractive because only the mandatory contribution is subject to a tax 
allowance. It is even worse for low income earners as most of them are free from tax after 
deducting the basic allowance, and thus receive no tax allowance at all. Therefore, the 
 90
MPFA not only penalises those who fail to make contributions, it offers no incentive for 
people to make voluntary contribution.  
 
In each scheme, the capital preservation fund (CPF) must be provided to offer a low risk 
protection for the low income group. It is doubtful whether this economic factor alone is 
the determinant in making a fund choice decision. For low earners, the cost of taking high 
risk investment may be low, since they can apply for CSSA. Means-tested social security 
will not only discourage the low income group to make additional saving, but will also 
encourage opportunistic behaviour. The retirement benefits reform should incorporate 
social security reform together as well. 
 
6.2.3 Withdrawal of MPF Benefits 
An underdeveloped defined contribution national provident fund provides a basic social 
security protection in a lump sum payment (Mckinnon et al, 2000). The MPF scheme is 
only a foundation for saving, but not for generating income after retirement.  Scheme 
members may withdraw lump sum benefits in order to enjoy the freedom of spending. 
The government has a minimal intervention policy in how benefits are withdrawn. 
However, it seems to conflict with the rationale of compulsory saving, which takes into 
account that individuals are self serving (Siu, 2001). In this research, 83 percent of 
respondents indicated that they would apply for social security, when the benefits are 
used up. In fact, the lump sum withdrawal method is already abused. Between 2001 and 
2004, over HK$19 hundred million MPF benefits were claimed for various reasons. Over 
8 hundred million was withdrawn on the grounds of permanent departure from Hong 
Kong. Scheme members may withdraw the benefit easily, by claiming that they will go to 
China. They can then return to work in Hong Kong without violating any legislation. It is 
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a concern that a substantial number of MPF members withdrew their benefit at the same 
time that this would affect the stability of the financial market. Hence, the existing 
schemes seem to encourage myopic, morally dubious and opportunistic behaviour to 
obtain and then spend benefits rapidly in order to apply for social assistance later.   
 
6.2.4 Contribution Rate 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 10 percent MPF contribution rate is lower than 
most Asian countries. Individuals may face short term interruptions from work, so extra 
saving is needed as a complement to avoid lower living standard after retirement (Deaton, 
1992). The UK pension group suggested defined contribution scheme members should 
contribute at least 10 percent of their income for an adequate pension. The top income 
quintile individuals save more than 10 percent. Based on ‘rule of thumb’, 15 percent of 
earning is required to save for a comfortable retirement (Pension Provision Group, 1998). 
In the MPF, which is only 4 years, older age groups are required to make a higher 
contribution rate as showed in fig 6.1  (Blake, 1997). 
 
Fig 6.1 Additional voluntary Contribution Rate for different age groups 
Contribution needed to achieve a pension of two-thirds final salary 
Age Commencement   Required contributions (% of salary) 
25 10.90 
30 13.41 
35 16.81 
40 21.66 
45 28.92 
50 40.81 
55 64.15 
60 129.83 
 
Assumptions: Male retiring at age 65; no previous contribution into any other pension scheme; salary 
increase by 3% p.a.; investment return 6% p.a. 
Source: Blake (1997)  
 
However, to substantially increase the contribution rate may not be feasible in Hong 
Kong. People aged about 30 are planning to save for contemporary needs including 
marriage, home purchases and having children. An increase in the MPF contribution 
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would be a heavy burden for this age group to bear, and could induce them to take a   
high interest loan or to defer their family plans (Siu, 2001). These would induce counter 
effects to retirement protection, since people would delay marriage and the starting of 
family life. The number of future workers will drop, and dependency ratio will further 
increase.  
 
With reference to Singapore, the Central Provident Fund (CPF) contribution rate is 
relative high at 40 percent including mandatory healthcare savings. CPF members can 
borrow money from the account to buy residential units. However, retirees complain that 
they are rich in assets but poor in income (Lindeman, 2002).  Housing can be part of 
personal wealth and promote saving and asset accumulation, but it can also be a burden 
and a negative asset. The property price in Hong Kong dramatically dropped 70 percent 
from 1997 to 2003.  Therefore, encouraging additional voluntary saving is more sensible. 
Individuals can rely on their own financial abilities and have their own saving plan.  
 
6.2.5 Management Fee  
The MPF management fee is not high, ranging between 2 to 3 percent of contribution per 
year, but a one percent increase of the annual management fee would substantially reduce 
an amount of accrued benefits by 20 percent after 40 working years (Diamond, 1999). 
However, the MPFA cannot control the fee. Because of the low MPF profit margins, 
service providers are keen to acquire a strong client base by merger and acquisition to 
benefit form subsequent economies of scale and scope. For instance, AIA is allied with 
Jardine Fleming, and HSBC took over Pacific Century’s MPF services (Ho et al., 2004). 
It is a concern that when only a few providers survive in the market, they could use their 
oligopoly powers to increase the fees due to MPFA cannot regulate the fee.  
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6.2.6 Investment Return 
Fig 6.2 Annualised Rate of Return of the MPF System Weighted by Net Contributions   
 Annualised Rate of Return Annualized Composite Consumer 
Price Index % Change 
1.4.2001 - 31.3.2002  -2.9% -2.15% 
1.4.2002 - 31.3.2003 -12.1% -2.09% 
1.4.2003 - 31.3.2004  19.2% -2.13% 
1.4.2004 - 31.3.2005 4.0% 0.87% 
1.4.2001 - 31.3.2005  4.3% -1.38                                                              
# This method calculates the rate of return, net of expenses, of the whole MPF System over a particular period by taking into account the timing of 
contributions into and benefit withdrawals from the System. 
Source: MPFA Annual Report (2005) 
 
The MPF investment return fluctuates, as shown in fig. 6.2. In year 2002/03 the 
annualised rate of return dropped over by 12 percent, and then rose to over 19 percent in 
the next year 2003/04. If a member retired at the time of the economic downturn, their 
accrued benefit will be greatly reduced. For instance, the Dutch pension funds achieved 
high returns in the stock market in the 90s. Employees enjoyed better pension benefits 
without paying extra contributions. The financial downturn in 2002 resulted in falling in 
bond yields and thus an increase in liability. The financial buffer was exhausted (Els et al, 
2004). Also, fund managers may have moral hazard problem. The MPF contributions are 
not their money, they would not caution about investment returns. MPF service providers, 
trustees and fund managers are required to have a sense of corporate governance and 
social responsibility, but fund management is particularly difficult to police 
 
6.2.7 Capital Preservation Fund 
The CPF is mostly invested in low risk products such as short-term Hong Kong Dollar 
bank deposits and high quality debt security. According to the MPF ordinance, 
administrative expenses can only be deducted from a CPF when the returns of the fund 
for the month exceed the monthly savings rate prescribed by the MPFA. However, the 
saving rate has been at a low level 0.83 percent in 2005 July (Fig 6.3). Under certain 
circumstance, it is possible that the administrative fee charged will exceed investment 
return. Hence, the name of CPF is misleading. It does not only guarantee any return, but 
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may also induce loss. In this research, 43 percent of respondents did not understand that 
the CPF could suffer loss. The CPF is probably neither attractive nor a hedge against 
inflation to protect retirement.   
 
Fig 6.3 Capital Preservation Fund Prescribed Saving Rate 
Year (Dec)        Prescribed Savings Rate (%)  
2000 4.7500 
2001 0.3333 
2002 0.0100 
2003 0.0100 
2004 0.0100 
Source: MPFA Annual Report (2005)  
 
6.2.8 MPF Investment Knowledge 
The poor investment knowledge may not only be caused by a lack of interest, but also by 
imperfect information. Symmetric information can help to balance the powers between 
service providers and scheme members. The MPFA has introduced a standardised fee 
table to facilitate comparison across funds and across schemes, and minimise the use of 
differing terminology, in order to facilitate understanding of fees and charges. 
Transparency of fund information has been improved. However, a MPF research found 
consumers still have difficulty in using information about percentages, compounding and 
mathematical interpretation of fees and charge (MPFAb, 2004). In this research, 90 
percent of respondents also indicated that they did not know how to calculate retirement 
benefits. The mean score of understanding of MPF funds was 3.15. Though the ways of 
presenting data are in simple format, scheme members without basic investment 
knowledge are still having difficult in understanding MPF investment issues.  
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6.2.9 Minimum Voluntary Contribution Amount 
The MPF scheme is a relatively low cost way of saving compared with other unit trusts 
annual charges range from 1.5 percent to 5 percent (Ho, 1997). Apart from the mandatory 
5 percent contribution, scheme members may choose to buy additional voluntary 
contributions, but there is no tax allowance as an incentive on these voluntary 
contributions. Some schemes set a minimum contribution. For example, HSBC members 
must contribute at least HK$300 per month or HK$1,000 as an ad hoc lump sum (HSBC, 
2005).  The poor may face resource exclusion, as they lack enough disposable income to 
fulfil the minimum requirement. In addition, most service providers only allow existing 
scheme members to make a voluntary contribution. The unemployed person is excluded 
from this service. 
 
6.2.10 Competition 
Under the current MPF system, selection of services providers is the responsibility of 
employers. They have no direct interest in management fees and fund performance, since 
all MPF contributions are immediately vested to employees. Employers do not have an 
incentive to change service providers, since it involves complicated administrative 
procedures in termination of the old scheme, re-registration of all employees and fund 
transfer to the new scheme; hence there is an actual disincentive for an employer to do 
this. Not all employees will agree to change service providers, even those who are 
expected to make losses and affect fund redemption.   Hence, scheme members may not 
benefit from direct competition, and have no direct method of changing an inefficient 
service provider.  
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6.3 Recommendation  
6.3.1 Financial Inclusion 
Lack of trust and understanding are a major barrier to the take up of financial services.  
People are much more likely to save, when they can see the value of their growing 
investment. The UK government introduced a Financial Inclusion Taskforce to improve 
accessible services, affordable products, and also face to face financial advice (Financial 
Secretary, 2004). The British government uses post offices and banks as delivery channels 
to reduce access exclusion (FSAa, 2000), but some pensioners who may distrust banks 
would prefer to collect their pensions from the post office. The MPFA could adopt a 
similar method to deliver retirement services via the post office and Housing Authority 
Branches. Specifically, the Hong Kong post office is now assisting in distribution of the 
CSSA payment, which could facilitate offering retirement services at the same time. 
Housing Authority Branches are also easily accessible to the low income group in public 
housing areas. The MPFA can be an independent adviser may address financial literacy, 
and work to restore trust and confidence in retirement protection.   
 
6.3.2 Retirement Education and Information 
In this research, peoples knowledge about MPF and investment issues remains low 
regardless of their demographic backgrounds. The MPF public education is needed by 
most people. Education helps consumers to make appropriate choices and to better 
manage their wealth. Education may be through various means such as brochures, leaflets, 
seminars and the internet. Bernheim and Garett (1996) found education can affect saving 
behaviour and increase contribution rates. Improving financial capability may improve the 
commitment of asset accumulation and saving. The US Employee Benefit Research 
Institute (2003) found that the value of education to people who took an interest in 
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planning their own retirement, and found it effective. Non savers needed a simpler 
message backed up with basic materials. Retirees need to know more about the efficient 
spending and lump sum retirement benefit, in order to avoid binge spending. A more pro-
active action is needed to educate the youngsters in schools or to provide workplace 
education, so as to prevent financial exclusion being transferred to next generation. 
Partnerships between government and financial institutions are required to cultivate a 
saving culture and to improve financial capability. 
 
6.3.3 Investment Knowledge and Information  
The defined contribution scheme is self-directed, in which individuals bear investment 
risk of gain or loss. The asset allocation can make a great difference in retirement income. 
Usually, high risk investment is associated with high return. People equipped with more 
financial knowledge are more likely to invest in equities for their pension scheme. 
Economic theory also suggests that individuals need financial knowledge to choose an 
optimal portfolio. 
According to the MPF ordinance, service providers should issue an annual benefit 
statement to members. The statement simply provides the contribution amount and 
investment return within a financial year. Scheme members cannot easily compare the 
cumulated investment return in total. Further improvement may be effected by clearly 
stating how much has been contributed since the account was opened, how much   
administration fee was charged, what is the expected amount which will be received on 
retirement. These amendments will improve the detailed understanding of the MPF 
account, and individuals may use their account performance in deciding to save more and 
to deploy an appropriate portfolio (Guariglia and Markose, 2000).    
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6.3.4 Risk Knowledge 
Retirement investments involve several kinds of risk. Economic conditions cannot be 
predicted accurately.  Economic downturn may greatly reduce the value of benefit by the 
time of retirement. Scheme members thus bear investment risk from their chosen 
investment portfolio. In addition, the only way to hedge against the risk of longer life 
spans will be to reduce benefits. In Japan, the life expectancy for males increase from 67 
years old in 1953 to 82 years old in 1990, and the retirement benefit was reduced by 30 
percent (Thompson, 1998). Annuities can be a way to hedge against longer life spans, but 
it is not a common investment vehicle in Hong Kong. In this research, only 38 percent of 
respondents choose an annuity. However, annuitisation also involves an interest risk. 
When there is a low real interest rate at the time of retirement, the amount of real annuity 
will be lower. Scheme members have to increase the portion of long term bonds in the 
investment portfolio to protect themelves from the risk (Siu, 2001). To assess the above 
risks, scheme members need professional advice in projection of the saving rate. The 
MPFA can teach the public to know more about risks, so as to enable employees to find 
suitable retirement products by themselves. Risk assessment can be done through the 
MPFA website to enable individuals to know their level of risk.   
 
6.3.5 Lifelong Education 
Middle aged people may face employment difficulties. Some of them are forced to retire 
early due to low education levels and lack of skills (Dohm, 2000). Once workers fall out 
of the labour market, they will lose the MPF protection. Thus, continuous education and 
returning is important to maintain these workers in the labour market (Chow et al, 2005). 
However, the government provides a Continuing Education Fund for those aged up to 60.  
Basically, MPF members can withdraw MPF benefits at aged 65. There is a gap between 
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working and retirement ages. Hence, the government should remove the age limit of the 
Continual Education subsidy in order to encourage unskilled and older workers to remain 
in the labour market and retirement schemes.  
 
6.3.6 Sufficient Financial instruments 
To avoid people taking opportunistic behaviour and withdrawing the lump sum benefits 
prior to retirement, using the reason of permanent departure, and to avoid the rapid 
spending of lump sum benefits in order to apply for CSSA. The MPFA may learn from 
the Chilean pension system where scheme members either purchase an annuity or are 
required to withdraw a portion of benefits periodically (OECE, 1997). Moreover, retirees 
need products such as high quality and fixed income vehicles like zero coupon bonds and 
annuities which pay out during retirement. The high quality bonds and fixed income 
markets are probably immature in Asia. The personal annuities in Hong Kong is very 
small, only 247 annuity schemes were taken up in 1998. Annuities are also expensive 
because of adverse selection, since insurers attempt to screen out bad risks. They are high 
earns who live longer. Most retirees may be priced out of the annuity market. 
 
Thus HKSAR Government may consider intervention to facilitate the development of 
annuity and bond market, and thus address the adverse selection problem and pooling the 
mortality risks (Siu, 2001). The government can issue bonds to reduce default risk. For 
instance, the US government issued a 30-year Treasury Bond in 2001 in the low interest 
rate environment (Schich, 2004). In USA, UK and France, there are inflation indexed 
bonds.  
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6.3.7 MPF and Social Security Reform 
 A comprehensive pension system should provide saving, redistribution and insurance. 
However, MPF is mainly functioning as a saving system without redistribution and 
insurance effects (Siu, 2001).  A carrot and stick approach can be used to encourage 
people to make voluntary contributions.  For the low income group, incentives rather than 
a tax allowance would be more effective. In the UK, Save Gateway pilots were launched 
to match savings pound for pound up to 25 pounds per month. Sui (2001) also suggested 
the government uses a top up approach to provide a top up contributions for the low 
earners. For instance, those people who are earning less than HK$5,000 per month, and 
are employees do not pay into the MPF scheme. The government could pay that portion 
in order to enable every scheme member to have contribution worth 10 percent of income 
from employers and employees in total. In fact, the top-up contribution is a kind of long 
term investment rather than expenditure for the future.  
 
To conclude, education and information plays an important role in improving 
understanding and saving with the MPF. It facilitates financial inclusion, improves 
knowledge of risk and investment, offering more investment instruments and 
encouraging life long learning are critical to raise the awareness of MPF, in order to 
increase the commitment of workers and enable them to value the MPF scheme. Co-
operation is required between the MPFA, academics, trustees and consultants in 
introducing these measures. In future, retirement benefit reform should be incorporated 
with social security reform in order to offer more incentives for individual saving and to 
eliminate opportunistic behaviour.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion  
7.1 Conclusion 
In conclusion, understanding of the MPF and investment issues remains at a low level in 
Hong Kong. This could neither help improve the saving habit nor better planning for 
retirement. Current saving and level of voluntary contribution is probably below an 
adequate level. Age, having children and home ownership are the most influential factors 
causing people to save for retirement. People in Hong Kong look forward to retiring early. 
They wish to take personal responsibility.  If individuals cannot be self-reliant, they will 
ultimately rely on social security. Hence, government responsibility for the aged is 
inevitable.  
 
In dealing with the demographic challenges, the MPF is only a basic retirement saving 
system, helping to shift the burden of retirement protection towards the individual. 
HKSAR government does not regard it as its duty to ensure individuals have adequate 
savings for retirement. Instead it acts as a regulator to maintain a simple and transparent 
market in pension products, in order to develop more simple, risk-controlled and low cost 
products. 
 
In addition, the MPF does not any guarantee investment returns or does not offer 
annuitisation, redistribution or insurance. If Scheme members hope to have 
comprehensive retirement protection, they should purchase insurance or increase their 
contribution rate. Saving has become part of investment through retirement schemes. 
Institutionalised saving facilities a more liquid and efficient financial market. In future, 
investment companies, banks and insurers will play a critical role in promoting retirement 
benefit.  
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Finally, increase of the mandatory rate may not be feasible, as it may not be affordable for 
the younger age group. The CSSA provides a safety net for vulnerable people and the 
means tested old age programmes provide a disincentive and encourage opportunistic 
behaviour by the low earners. In the long run, the government requires to develop 
cooperate responsibility with employers, financial institutions and individuals, and to 
conduct a comprehensive funding reform incorporated with both the MPF and old-age 
schemes.  
 
7.2 Limitation and Direction of Future Research  
In this research, questionnaires were distributed through companies. Respondents are 
therefore employees, with no involvement from any self employed person, exempted 
persons or housewives.  All the participants were aged below 60 years, since they have 
only been in the scheme a short time they have few accrued benefit. The older age group 
are not motivated to participate.  Further research can be targeted on the low income and 
excluded groups to investigate how to improve the coverage of the scheme.  
 
Saving and pensions are complicated issues interlinked with economics, social and 
political aspects. It is unlikely that the old age problem would be solved by any one of 
these disciplines. Because of limited time and resources, this research only focuses on 
quantitative methods. A more exploratory and in depth investigation would give greater 
insight. A mixture of qualitative and qualitative research could be conducted in future by 
asking respondents reasons and barriers for retirement savings. The level of risk, trust and 
security which may affect saving orientation can be further evaluated.  
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 Appendix 1 
 
List of Approved Trustees 
 
American International Assurance Company (Trustee) Limited 
 
AXA China Region Trustees Limited 
 
Bank Consortium Trust Company Limited 
 
Bank of Communications Trustee Limited 
 
Bank of East Asia (Trustees) Limited 
 
BOCI-Prudential Trustee Limited 
 
China Life Trustees Limited 
 
Cititrust Limited 
 
CMG Asia Trustee Company Limited 
 
Dexiz Trust Services Hong Kong Limited 
 
HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Asia) Limited 
 
HSBC Provident Fund Trustee (Hong Kong) Limited 
 
ING Pension Trust Limited 
 
Manulife Provident Funds Trust Company Limited 
 
Massmutual Trustees Limited 
 
MLC Trustees (Hong Kong) Limited 
 
Pacific Century Trustees Limited 
 
Principal Trust Company (Asia) Limited 
 
Royal Bank of Canada Trust Company (Asia) Limited 
 
Source: Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority Annual Report 2004-05 
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Appendix 2 
 
MPF Schemes and Constituent Funds 
 
MPF SCHEME UNDERLYING CONSTITUENT FUNDS 
 
AIA-JF Comprehensive Capital  
Retirement Benefit MPF Scheme  
 
Preservation Portfolio  
Guaranteed Portfolio 
AIA-JF Mandatory Provident Fund Scheme Asian Equity Fund 
Fund Scheme Balanced Portfolio 
Capital Preservation Portfolio 
Conservative Portfolio 
European Equity Fund 
Greater China Equity Fund 
Growth Portfolio 
Guaranteed Portfolio 
Hong Kong Equity Fund 
Japan Equity Fund 
North American Equity Fund 
 
Bank Consortium Industry Plan 
 
BCT Asian Equity Fund 
BCT Balanced Fund 
BCT Capital Preservation Fund 
BCT Global Bond Fund 
BCT Global Equity Fund 
BCT Growth Fund 
BCT Hong Kong Equity Fund 
BCT Stable Fund 
 
Bank Consortium MPF Plan 
 
Bank Consortium Asian Equity Fund 
Bank Consortium Balanced Fund 
Bank Consortium Capital Preservation Fund 
Bank Consortium Global Bond Fund 
Bank Consortium Global Equity Fund 
Bank Consortium Growth Fund 
Bank Consortium Hong Kong Equity Fund 
Bank Consortium Stable Fund 
 
BCOM Joyful Retirement MPF Scheme 
 
 
BCOM Guaranteed (CF) Fund 
MPF Scheme BCOM Joyful Capital Preservation (CF) 
Fund 
 
BCOM Prosperous Retirement BCOM Balanced (CF) 
Fund MPF Scheme 
 
BCOM Balanced (CF) Fund 
MPF Scheme BCOM Prosperous Capital Preservation 
(CF) Fund 
BCOM Stable Growth (CF) Fund 
 
BEA (MPF) Industry Scheme 
 
BEA (Industry Scheme) Balanced Fund 
BEA (Industry Scheme) Capital Preservation Fund 
BEA (Industry Scheme) Growth Fund 
BEA (Industry Scheme) Stable Fund 
 
BEA (MPF) Master Trust Scheme 
 
BEA (MPF) Balanced Fund 
BEA (MPF) Capital Preservation Fund 
BEA (MPF) Growth Fund 
BEA (MPF) Long Term Guaranteed Fund 
BEA (MPF) Stable Fund 
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MPF SCHEME UNDERLYING CONSTITUENT FUNDS 
 
BOC-Prudential Easy-Choice Mandatory Provident Fund 
Scheme 
 
BOC-Prudential Balanced Fund 
BOC-Prudential Bond Fund 
BOC-Prudential Capital Preservation 
BOC-Prudential Global Equity Fund 
BOC-Prudential Growth Fund 
BOC-Prudential Hong Kong Equity 
BOC-Prudential Stable Fund 
 
China Life MPF Master Trust Scheme 
 
China Life Balanced Fund 
Trust Scheme China Life Capital Preservation Fund 
China Life Growth Fund 
China Life Guaranteed Return Fund 
 
CMG Rainbow 65 
 
CMG Balanced Portfolio Fund 
CMG Capital Preservation Fund 
CMG Fixed Income Fund 
CMG Hong Kong Equity Fund 
CMG Progressive Growth Fund 
CMG Stable Income Fund 
 
Double Easy Mandatory Provident Fund 
 
Double Easy Balanced Fund 
Double Easy Capital Preservation Fund 
Double Easy Cash Fund 
Double Easy Growth Fund 
Double Easy Guaranteed Fund 
Double Easy Stable Fund 
Double Easy Top Select Fund 
 
Dresdner RCM MPF Master Trust 
 
Balanced Fund 
Capital Preservation Fund 
Capital Stable Fund 
Growth Fund 
Stable Growth Fund 
 
Dresdner RCM MPF Plan 
 
Absolute Return Fund 
Asian Fund 
Balanced Fund 
Capital Preservation Fund 
Capital Stable Fund 
Growth Fund 
Hong Kong Fund 
Stable Growth Fund 
 
Eagle Star MPF Scheme - Advance Planner 
 
Eagle Star Accumulation Fund 
Eagle Star Capital Preservation Fund 
Eagle Star Global Growth Fund 
Eagle Star Guarantee Fund 
Eagle Star HK Dollar Savings Fund 
 
Eagle Star MPF Scheme –Security Planner 
 
Eagle Star Capital Preservation Fund 
Eagle Star Guarantee Fund 
Eagle Star HK Dollar Savings Fund 
 
Elite Mandatory Provident Fund 
 
Capital Preservation Fund 
Multi-Manager Balanced Fund 
Multi-Manager Growth Fund 
Multi-Manager Hong Kong Equity Fund 
Multi-Manager Stable Fund 
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MPF SCHEME UNDERLYING CONSTITUENT FUNDS 
 
Fidelity Retirement Master Trust 
 
Balanced Fund 
Capital Preservation Fund 
Capital Stable Fund 
Global Equity Fund 
Growth Fund 
Hong Kong Bond Fund 
Hong Kong Equity Fund 
Stable Growth Fund 
World Bond Fund 
Hang Seng Mandatory Provident Fund – SuperTrust 
 
Balanced Fund 
Capital Preservation Fund 
Growth Fund 
Guaranteed Fund 
Hang Seng Index Tracking Fund 
 
Hang Seng Mandatory  Provident Fund – SuperTrust Plus 
 
Asian Equity Fund 
Balanced Fund 
Capital Preservation Fund 
European Equity Fund 
Growth Fund 
Guaranteed Fund 
Hang Seng Index Tracking Fund 
Hong Kong Equity Fund 
North American Equity Fund 
Stable Growth Fund 
 
HSBC Mandatory Provident Fund – SuperTrust 
 
Balanced Fund 
Capital Preservation Fund 
Growth Fund 
Guaranteed Fund 
Hang Seng Index Tracking Fund 
 
HSBC Mandatory Provident Fund – SuperTrust Plus 
 
Asian Equity Fund 
Capital Preservation Fund 
European Equity Fund 
Growth Fund 
Guaranteed Fund 
Hang Seng Index Tracking Fund 
Hong Kong Equity Fund 
North American Equity Fund 
Stable Growth Fund 
 
ING MPF Master Trust Basic Scheme 
 
ING MPF  Balanced Growth 
Basic Scheme Basic Portfolio 
ING MPF Basic Scheme Capital 
Guaranteed Portfolio 
ING MPF Basic Scheme Capital 
Preservation Portfolio 
ING MPF Basic Scheme Hong Kong 
Equity Portfolio 
ING MPF Basic Scheme International 
Equity Portfolio 
ING MPF Basic Scheme Stable Growth Portfolio 
 
ING MPF Master Trust ING Comprehensive Scheme 
 
ING MPF Comprehensive Scheme Asian 
Equity Portfolio 
ING MPF Comprehensive Scheme Balanced 
Growth Portfolio 
ING MPF Comprehensive Scheme Capital 
Guaranteed Portfolio 
ING MPF Comprehensive Scheme Capital 
Preservation Portfolio 
ING MPF Comprehensive Scheme 
Growth Portfolio 
 116
ING MPF Comprehensive Scheme Hong Kong 
Equity Portfolio 
ING MPF Comprehensive Scheme International 
Equity Portfolio 
ING MPF Comprehensive Scheme Stable 
Growth Portfolio 
ING MPF Comprehensive Scheme 
Stable Portfolio 
 
INVESCO Strategic MPF Scheme 
 
Balanced Fund 
Capital Preservation Fund 
Capital Stable Fund 
Global Bond Fund 
Growth Fund 
Guaranteed Fund 
Hong Kong Equity Fund 
 
Jones Lang LaSalle Property  
Management Division Mandatory  
Provident Fund Scheme 
 
Jones Lang LaSalle Capital Preserva ion Fund  t
Jones Lang LaSalle Guarantee Fund 
Kingsway MPF Master Trust 
 
Kingsway Asia Pacific (excluding HK) Fund 
Kingsway Capital Preservation Fund 
Kingsway Global Diversification Fund 
Kingsway Hong Kong SAR Fund 
Kingsway Korea Fund 
 
Manager Elite Master Trust 
 
AXA Balanced Fund 
BNP Capital Preservation Fund 
Dresdner RCM Balanced Fund 
Fidelity Balanced Fund 
INVESCO Balanced Fund 
Managed Capital Stable Fund 
Managed Growth Fund 
Managed Stable Growth Fund 
Schroder Balanced Fund 
 
Manulife Global Select (MPF) Scheme 
 
Manulife MPF Aggressive Fund 
Manulife MPF Capital Preservation Fund 
Manulife MPF European Equity Fund 
Manulife MPF Fidelity Growth Fund 
Manulife MPF Fidelity Stable Growth Fund 
Manulife MPF Growth Fund 
Manulife MPF Hong Kong Bond Fund 
Manulife MPF Hong Kong Equity Fund 
Manulife MPF Interest Fund 
Manulife MPF International Bond Fund 
Manulife MPF International Equity Fund 
Manulife MPF Japan Equity Fund 
Manulife MPF North American Equity Fund 
Manulife MPF Pacific Asia Equity Fund 
Manulife MPF Stable Fund 
 
Manu-Lifestyle (MPF) Scheme 
 
Manulife MPF Aggressive Fund 
Manulife MPF Capital Preservation Fund 
Manulife MPF Growth Fund 
Manulife MPF Interest Fund 
Manulife MPF Stable Fund 
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MPF SCHEME UNDERLYING CONSTITUENT FUNDS 
 
Mass Mandatory Provident Fund Scheme 
 
Asian Balanced Fund 
Capital Preservation Fund 
Global Bond Fund 
Global Equity Fund 
Global Growth Fund 
Global Stable Fund 
Guaranteed Growth Fund 
 
MLC MPF Master Trust Scheme 
 
Templeton Global Equity Fund 
Balanced Fund 
Capital Preservation Fund 
Growth Fund 
 
New-Alliance Mandatory Capital Growth Fund 
Provident Fund Scheme 
 
Capital Growth Fund 
Capital Preservation Fund 
Global Balanced Fund 
Income Fund 
 
PCI Master Trust MPF Scheme 
 
PCI Capital Preservation Fund 
PCI Fixed Income Fund 
PCI Global Balanced Fund 
PCI Hong Kong Fund 
 
Principal MPF Scheme Series 200 
 
Principal Capital Preservation Fund 
Principal HK Dollar Savings Fund 
Principal Long Term Guaranteed Fund 
 
Principal MPF Scheme Series 500 
 
Aggressive Growth Fund 
Balanced Growth Fund 
Capital Preservation Fund 
Guaranteed Fund 
Stable Growth Fund 
 
Principal MPF Scheme Series 600 
 
Principal Capital Preservation Fund 
Principal Global Growth Fund 
Principal HK Dollar Savings Fund 
Principal Long Term Accumulation Fund 
Principal Long Term Guaranteed Fund 
 
Principal MPF Scheme Series 800 
 
Principal Asian Equity Fund 
Principal Capital Guaranteed Fund 
Principal Capital Preservation Fund 
Principal Global Growth Fund 
Principal HK Dollar Savings Fund 
Principal International Bond Fund 
Principal International Equity Fund 
Principal Long Term Accumulation Fund 
Principal Long Term Guaranteed Fund 
Principal Stable Yield Fund 
Principal US Dollar Savings Fund 
Principal US Equity Fund 
 
Principal MPF Scheme Series B300 
 
Principal Balanced Fund 
Principal Capital Preservation Fund 
Principal Conservative Fund 
Principal Growth Fund 
Principal International Bond Fund 
Principal Long Term Guaranteed Fund 
Principal U.S. Equity Fund 
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MPF SCHEME UNDERLYING CONSTITUENT FUNDS 
 
Schroder MPF Master Trust 
 
Schroder MPF Asian Portfolio 
Schroder MPF Balanced Investment Portfolio 
Schroder MPF Capital Guaranteed Portfolio 
Schroder MPF Capital Preservation Portfolio 
Schroder MPF Capital Stable Portfolio 
Schroder MPF Growth Portfolio 
Schroder MPF HK Dollar Fixed Income Portfolio 
Schroder MPF Hong Kong Portfolio 
Schroder MPF International Portfolio 
Schroder MPF Stable Growth Portfolio 
 
SHKP MPF Sponsored Scheme 
 
Dresdner Stable Growth Fund 
Fidelity Balanced Fund 
Fidelity Stable Growth Fund 
HSBC Capital Stable Fund 
New-Alliance Global Balanced Fund 
SHKP MPF Fund 
Standard Chartered Capital Preservation 
Fund – SHKP 
Standard Chartered Career Average 
Guaranteed Fund – SHKP 
 
Standard Chartered MPF Plan – Advanced 
 
Citi Balanced Fund 
Citi Conservative Fund 
Citi Hong Kong Equities Fund 
Dresdner RCM Balanced Fund 
Dresdner RCM Capital Stable Fund 
Dresdner RCM Growth Fund 
Fidelity Global Investment Fund – 
Balanced Fund 
Fidelity Global Investment Fund – 
Capital Stable Fund 
Fidelity Global Investment Fund – Growth Fund 
HSBC MPF “A” – Balanced Fund 
HSBC MPF “A” – Hong Kong Equity Fund 
HSBC MPF “A” – Stable Fund 
INVESCO Global Balanced Fund 
INVESCO Global Equities Fund 
INVESCO MPF Bond Fund 
Merrill Lynch Strategy Trust – 
Flexible Balanced Fund 
Merrill Lynch Strategy Trust – Flexible 
BondPlus Fund 
Merrill Lynch Strategy Trust – Flexible 
EquityPlus Fund 
Schroder MPF Asian Fund 
Schroder MPF Balanced Investment Fund 
Schroder MPF HK Dollar Fixed Income Fund 
Standard Chartered Balanced Fund – Advanced 
Standard Chartered Capital Preservation Fund – 
Advanced 
Standard Chartered Career Average Guaranteed 
Fund – Advanced 
Standard Chartered Growth Fund – Advanced 
Standard Chartered Stable Fund – Advanced 
Templeton MPF Asian Balanced Fund 
Templeton MPF Global Bond Fund 
Templeton MPF Global Equity Fun 
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MPF SCHEME UNDERLYING CONSTITUENT FUNDS 
 
Standard Chartered MPF Plan –Basic 
 
Standard Chartered Balanced Fund – Basic 
Standard Chartered Capital Preservation 
Fund – Basic 
Standard Chartered Career Average Guaranteed 
Fund – Basic 
Standard Chartered Growth Fund – Basic 
Standard Chartered Stable Fund – Basic 
 
Tai Ping Retire-Easy MPF  Master Trust Scheme 
 
Tai Ping Retire-Easy Balanced Fund 
Tai Ping Retire-Easy Capital Preservation Fund 
Tai Ping Retire-Easy Capital Stable Fund 
Tai Ping Retire-Easy Growth Fund 
Tai Ping Retire-Easy Guarantee Fund 
 
Zurich-Chinese Bank MPF  Scheme – Premier 
 
Zurich-Chinese Bank Capital Preservation Fund 
Zurich-Chinese Bank Guarantee Fund 
Zurich-Chinese Bank HK Dollar Savings Fund 
 
Zurich-Chinese Bank MPF  Scheme – PremierDELUXE 
 
Zurich-Chinese Bank Accumulation Fund 
Zurich-Chinese Bank Asian Equity Fund 
Zurich-Chinese Bank Capital Guarantee Fund 
Zurich-Chinese Bank Capital Preservation Fund 
Zurich-Chinese Bank Global Growth Fund 
Zurich-Chinese Bank Guarantee Fund 
Zurich-Chinese Bank HK Dollar Savings Fund 
Zurich-Chinese Bank International Bond Fund 
Zurich-Chinese Bank International Equity 
Zurich-Chinese Bank Stable Yield Fund 
Zurich-Chinese Bank US Dollar Savings Fund 
Zurich-Chinese Bank US Equity Fund 
 
Source: Gadbury J., Taylor A., Watkin J. (2004) Pensions and Retirement Funds in Hong 
Kong, Hong Kong, ISI publication 
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Appendix 3  
MPF Questionnaire 
 
Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) 
Please CIRCLE the appropriate answers 
Expectation about MPF 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Disagree
1.MPF is adequate to protect a comfortable retirement 
life  
 
5 4 3 2 1 
2 MPF should be extended to cover all the population 
(including e.g. domestic helpers, hawkers, 
housewives).  
5 4 3 2 1 
 
3 Do you expect your retirement income to be higher / 
lower / same as the final salary? 
Higher
 
Same  
 
 Lower
 
 
4 Do you expect the MPF contribution rate will 
increase 10 years in future? 
Yes  No  
 
5 Do you expect people aged over 65 will continue 
MPF contribution?  
Yes  No  
 
6 Have you ever attended any MPF seminars/ talks? Yes  No  
 
 
7 Have you ever calculated how much you need to 
save for retirement? 
Yes  No  
 
8 Do you know the amount of  MPF accrual benefit 
will be accumulated when you retired? 
Yes 
 
 No  
 
 
Saving Behaviour 
9 Did you save before MPF came in? 
 
Yes  No  
 
10 When MPF came in, have you saved less / the 
same/ more? 
Less
 
Same   More
 
 
 
11 Have you yourself made any additional voluntary 
contributions towards your MPF account? 
Yes  No  
 
12 How much do you save a month for retirement? HK$
 
 / month 
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 Please CIRCLE the appropriate answers 
Saving Behaviour 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Disagree
13 Most of my saving is for the short-term, not for 
retirement 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
14 Personal savings is needed to supplement MPF 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
15 I am confident to save enough money for a 
comfortable retirement life.  
5 4 3 2 1 
 
Investment  
16 Which is the main information source you consult 
on MPF investment? 
a. Banks b. Insurance / brokers Ans:   
c. Employers d. Media (TV, newspaper)   
e. MPFA f. Internet 
g. Friends h. Never Consult 
  
17 Have you ever invested in stock market? 
 
Yes  No   
 
18 Will Capital preservation fund suffer loss? Yes  
 
No   
 
Please CIRCLE the appropriate answers 
Interest and preference regarding MPF 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Disagree
19 I understand the differences among different kinds 
MPF funds 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
20 I have received clear and easy understanding MPF 
related information and advice 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
21 Investing in stock is risky 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
 
Retirement Attitude 
22 What’s your expected retirement age?  Year old 
 
Lump 
Sum
 
Annuity 
  23 Do you expect your retirement benefit will be in 
lump sum or annuity?  
 
24 Do you expect your children will provide financial 
support towards your retirement? 
Yes  No  
 
25 If you use up retirement benefits, will you apply for 
social security from the government? 
Yes  No  
 122
 26 Which one of the following has the greatest 
responsibility for retirement? 
a. Myself b. Family Ans:   / others  
c. Employer d. Government     
 
Max HK$  /Month 27 What is the maximum amount of MPF contribution per 
month according to MPF ordinance?  
 
28 What is the normal retirement age to claim MPF?  Years old 
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Personal Information 
29 Gender Male   Female  
 
  
30 Age < 20  21-30  31-40  41-50  51-60  60 >  
  
31 Income <$20,000  $20,000- $39,999  >$40,000   
 
32 Education 
qualification 
Below 
Primary 
 Primary   Secondary  Tertiary/ University
 or above
 
 
33 Marital Status Single  Married
 
 
 
34 Children Have  Don’t 
have
 
 
35 Home owners Yes  No
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